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And yet the same question, “Why doesn’t she leave
him?” or its obverse, “Why does she stay?” continues
to gnaw at the moorings of the domestic violence
revolution. The durability of abusive relationships
remains their central paradox . . . .1
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Delaware Civil Law Clinic, Widener
University School of Law. The author has nineteen years of experience representing bat-
tered women seeking civil protection orders and custody of their children. I thank my
colleagues at Widener University School of Law, in particular Alicia Kelly, for providing
feedback and guidance on this Article at the Faculty Workshop: Works in Progress held
at Widener University School of Law (Feb. 21, 2013). I would also like to thank the staff
of the William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law.
1. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL
LIFE 113 (2007). Evan Stark and other advocates dedicated to ending abuse know all too
well that these questions are based on incorrect assumptions about women who experience
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This Article examines the connections between gender,2 violence,
and money. Financial impediments, in particular, play a major role
in restricting the freedoms enjoyed by women who are abused by their
intimate partners.3 Economics has both an empowering and disem-
powering influence on abusive relationships.4 While a batterer is
empowered by his partner’s financial dependence, the autonomy of
a woman who is victimized is diminished by her abuser’s ability to
control her through financial means.5 Moreover, financial instability
is one of the greatest reasons why, after gaining freedom, a woman
who experiences battering has limited choices and may ultimately
acquiesce to her partner’s attempts to reconcile.6
Economic instability is a link that binds a woman to her abuser.7
Regardless of the interveners in her case—law enforcement, family,
intimate partner violence. As Stark explains, “[i]t is the [batterers] who stay, not their
partners.” Id. at 130.
2. The focus of this Article is on female survivors of intimate partner violence, not
male victims. The author will refer to survivors of domestic violence with the use of
female personal pronouns for several reasons. First, this Article considers the influence
both gender and economics have on intimate partner violence. Second, although intimate
partner violence is not exclusively a crime against women, women constitute a significant
percentage of those individuals experiencing intimate partner violence. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “[f]emales are more likely than males to experience nonfatal
intimate partner violence.” See Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S.: Victim Character-
istics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/content/intimate/victims.cfm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2014).
3. The use, meaning, and influence of the phrases “women who are abused” or “women
who experience domestic abuse” as compared with the term “battered woman” demands
consideration. According to Elizabeth Schneider,
the term “battered woman” has a restrictive meaning—a meaning that
defines a women exclusively in terms of her battering experience. It also
suggests that the term carries a negative connotation from which an indi-
vidual woman may wish to distance herself . . . Compare the static term
“battered woman” with the phrase “woman who has be sexually harassed”
or even “woman who has been raped.” These terms describe a woman who
has been subjected to an external harm: they focus on the problem of the
harm—sexual harassment or rape—and leave the woman intact. In contrast,
“battered woman” does not capture the range and complexity of a woman’s
experiences beyond the facts of abuse. The term makes her the problem, not
her experiences.
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 61 (2000).
4. Economic Abuse, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.uncfsp
.org/projects/userfiles/File/DCE-STOP_NOW/NCADV_Economic_Abuse_Fact_Sheet.pdf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
5. Id.
6. For survivors of intimate partner violence, there are a number of barriers that dra-
matically decrease the likelihood of liberation from the cycle of abuse. Domestic Violence
and Barriers to Leaving, CITY OF RENTON, http://rentonwa.gov/living/default.aspx?id=1582
(last visited Jan. 10, 2014). These factors include, but are not limited to, the risk of harm,
social factors, law enforcement response, system response, homelessness, economic depen-
dence, and poverty. Id.
7. See infra Part II.
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or friends—as long as she remains financially dependent upon her
abuser it is exceedingly difficult for a woman who experiences inti-
mate partner violence to put a stop to the batterer’s control over her.
Arrest of the perpetrator, incarceration for a period of time, entry of
a criminal no-contact order, or the provision of a civil protection order
are all appropriate responses to intimate partner violence. Yet, with-
out ensuring that a survivor of domestic violence has food security,
housing stability, healthcare, childcare, adequate transportation, as
well as reasonable assurances of continuing resources or a guarantee
of enforcement of any court ordered relief, a batterer will continue
to maintain his power to abuse and control.
Economic independence can provide freedom from abuse. Yet,
when it comes to economic independence, gender matters. Given the
historical experience of women in the labor force and contemporary
social factors, many women today continue to be financially depen-
dent on their partners, women in abusive relationships in partic-
ular. Financial inequality is central to the female experience; it has
shaped her role within the marital relationship, diminished her au-
tonomy, influenced her place within the labor force, and nurtured
her oppression.
Early on, marriage and childbirth played a fundamental role in
the extent to which women participated in the labor force.8 Yet even
today, marriage and children continue to negatively influence the
extent to which women engage in work for pay. A woman’s absence
from the labor force results in diminished economic power within
the intimate relationship, as well as society generally. Inequality
results in reduced options for women which in turn places them at
risk for maltreatment. Not surprisingly, much of modern day eco-
nomic instability of women derives from our past. Part I of this
Article explores the history of women, money, and oppression, pro-
viding a framework for understanding the barriers women have
faced over time and verifying the ways in which access to fundamen-
tal resources and a promise of economic equality play a vital role in
the fight against intimate partner violence.
In Part II the connections between intimate partner violence,
capital, and power are considered. The exploration of batterer tar-
geting, entrapment, and economic abuse indicates that access to re-
sources and safety are closely tied.
Civil protection orders were created to provide an alternative to
criminal prosecution, as well as to address the distinct needs of women
who are abused by their intimate partners. These civil orders were
8. See infra Part I.
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formulated to both protect survivors of domestic violence and provide
the resources necessary to ensure freedom from abuse. The civil pro-
tection model, however, is not without its limitations. These insuffi-
ciencies, as they relate to the financial instability of survivors, are
considered in depth in Part III of the Article.
The reason for women’s increased risk of poverty at the time of
separation is multifaceted. Women generally are vulnerable to poverty
due to social welfare policy, wage inequality, gender discrimination,
diminished access to capital, and a history of inequality. Additionally,
our legal system’s failure to respond adequately to crimes committed
against women, in particular, and to provide the relief necessary to
protect them from male exploitation has placed women who are
abused at even greater risk of both poverty and violence.
Not only do women who experience battering face gender dis-
crimination, job sex-typing, and wage gaps within the labor force,
they also experience a multitude of employment-related problems
created by their batterers. Perpetrators of intimate partner violence
tend to be ultra-controlling. A batterer may restrict his partner’s ac-
cess to resources, exploit or destroy her property, or diminish her
ability to build social capital.9
Yet, labor and wage parity alone will not solve the problem. Our
government must step in and make available the resources neces-
sary to guarantee stability and safety for women and their children.
Moreover, holding batterers accountable for both their actions and
responsibilities plays an important role in solving this crisis.
I. A HISTORY OF INEQUALITY
The key to understanding woman’s present and
future economic position in the capitalist word lies
in history. For history is not simply the compila-
tion of facts, but, at its best, the discovery of the gen-
eral principles and process that have given rise to
these concrete experiences; not simply the study of
the past, but the study of the creation of the present
and future.10
A consideration of the history of the marital relationship and
gender based division of labor is critical to understanding the ways in
which money and power within that marital relationship influence
9. See infra Part II.C.3.
10. JULIE A. MATTHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 3 (Harvester
Press 1982).
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male violence against women, as well as the economic challenges
women continue to face today.11
The colonial period signifies the long-term struggle for women
in America both for financial independence and freedom from male
oppression.12 It is the historic oppression of women through physical
and sexual abuse which paved the way for male economic dominance
over women.13 Male violence against women, the economic dependence
of females on males, and the legal and social justifications for male
dominance are so closely linked that it is difficult to consider one
without addressing the others.
It is clear that there is a strong connection between the eco-
nomic struggles women experienced in early America and the status
of women within the marital relationship.14 Marriage gave a man
power over his wife.15 Marriage provided a man with the power to
control the property and finances of his wife, as well as her sexual
activities, social status, and liberty.16
In early American history a woman was not permitted to own
property and was, in fact, the property of the men in her life; first
her father or brother, later her husband.17 A colonial man was per-
mitted to “chastise” his wife through corporal punishment.18 The
husband controlled a woman’s experiences with and in connection
to the local economy.19 He was the decision-maker, holding all the
11. See STARK, supra note 1, at 113 (“[S]exual inequalities remain deeply embedded in
economic and personal life in the United States and other highly industrialized societies.”).
12. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 36.
13. Id.
14. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN 54 (1982) (“Colonial so-
ciety expected married women to be subordinate to their husbands who by law and custom
controlled women’s labor and access to economic resources.”).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 54–55. Abramovitz details the legal and social consequences of marriage
on women:
English Common Law, the basis of much American Law, caused married
women to suffer “civil death” by holding that in “marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage . . . . A married woman’s
inheritance, property, income, and even her clothing belonged to her
husband, who could sell her possessions without her consent. She could not
buy or sell, make contracts, sue in court, or be sued without her husband’s
permission. Married women could not even claim their children in cases of
legal separation.
17. See id.; see also Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property
Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 9 (1994).
18. Some English common laws, such as the “rule of thumb,” were adopted by the
colonists. The rule of thumb enabled a colonial man to punish (chastise) his wife as
English men were permitted to do. See NANCY K. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 6
(2009). Such laws continued the historical practice of men having the power to control
their wives through corporal punishment.
19. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 14, at 75–76.
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power. As a result, much of a woman’s life experience depended
greatly on the man she married.20 If she married a perpetrator of in-
timate partner violence, she was at great risk of suffering abuse with
little protection or avenue of escape. Her abuser had the ability to
control her life and work experiences unrestrained.
A colonial woman’s work experience was closely tied to her mar-
riage relationship.21 In fact, the colonial marriage relationship is one
of the predominant factors which encouraged the economic depen-
dence of women in our nation, an economic dependence which, in
turn, made women vulnerable to male sexual exploitation and phys-
ical abuse.22 These practices were supported by a legal system which
fostered the entrapment of women through both property23 and crim-
inal law.24
One historian in particular, Julie Matthaei, provides a detailed
account of the economic history of women in America.25 Although
Matthaei’s exploration does not directly address the relationships
between battering and money, her consideration of women’s eco-
nomic experiences within the marital relationship and the labor force
provides important information about the connections between gen-
der and economic dependence. In turn, understanding the role history
has played in the economic dependence of women is important to
identifying how perpetrators of intimate partner violence gain and
maintain control in an intimate relationship. As a result, Matthaei’s
work, as well as the work of other researchers, is analyzed in this
section to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the con-
nections between gender, violence, and money.
According to Matthaei, in colonial America the vast majority of
a married woman’s production was for the household, while a man’s
production was for sale.26 The work of the man was to earn wealth
20. Id. at 76.
21. See MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 36.
22. Id.
23. The law’s restriction on female property ownership placed women at the mercy
of men. See Evan Roberts, Woman’s Rights and Women’s Labor: Married Women’s
Property Law Reform and Labor Force Participation, 1870–1900, at 99 (Aug. 28, 2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota), available at http://paa2008
.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=80072 (considering the effect of property
laws on women’s participation in the labor force).
24. Although the colonies established some laws to protect women from severe abuse
by their husbands, “these laws were not strictly enforced, and domestic assaults were
typically excused if a husband could ‘justify’ his behavior.” See LEMON, supra note 18, at
6. Moreover, chastisement of one’s wife was an accepted practice. Id.
25. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 39–299.
26. Id. at 28. Matthaei explains that, “[n]ot only was her work determined by her hus-
band, it was often simply a crude, home-produced version of men’s commodity products.”
Id. at 50.
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for the family, while the work of the woman, within the home, was
intended to save the family money; caring for the children, providing
meals, cleaning, sewing, and accomplishing other tasks was a finan-
cial savings for the household. While the cost-saving measures were
good for the family as a whole, the practice entrapped many women,
chaining them to the home.27
Adding to a colonial woman’s burden was the low value society
placed on her work within the home.28 Yet, social views had little to do
with the true value of a woman’s work or on the efforts she exerted.
Many colonial women worked just as hard as their husbands;29 nev-
ertheless, the marital relationship was not one of equality. A wife’s
inferior status within the marital relationship can be attributed to
a combination of factors including economic inferiority, role choices,
lack of decision-making authority, as well as social norms.
Despite the physical similarities of the labor of men and women
in colonial America, the work men conducted garnered a higher
social value given its outcome—wealth building: wealth that pro-
vided men with power both at home and in society generally.30 The
“process branded woman’s home work as primitive, reinforcing the
prevailing conception of woman’s private work in the household as
‘natural’ . . . and justified man’s domination over women . . . .”31 This
notion of male privilege has had a long-lasting influence on women
generally and married women in particular.
The economic success of the white colonial woman was tied to
the man in her life. If her husband achieved economic success, she
27. Id. at 32. Women were tied to the home due to a variety of factors. For example,
“[t]he primary aspect of mothering in colonial times was the physical process of carrying
and bearing the child.” Id. at 38. Because a colonial wife bore an average of eight chil-
dren, much of her married life was spent either pregnant or nursing a child. Id. As such,
entry into the labor force was beyond the reach of most married colonial women.
28. Id. at 32.
29. For example, the provision of a meal in the colonial period was not a simple process.
“Cooking was not a physically easy job, nor was it a delicate one.” MATTHAEI, supra note 10,
at 42. It “was a crude process . . . without running water, electricity, or refrigeration.
Women cooked with brass or copper kettles often holding fifteen gallons of liquid, and
the huge iron pots they used weighed alone up to forty pounds each.” Id. Women slaugh-
tered animals, cooked and cleaned, managed the home, cared for large numbers of chil-
dren, and worked long hours daily. Id. According to Matthaei:
[T]he impact of work on the social position of the worker has never been
determined by the importance of that work to the economy; rather work’s
social meaning is determined by the constellation of social relationships
within which the work takes place. Just as the fact that the slave worked
harder than the master did not place the former above the latter, neither
did the fact that husband and wife often worked equally hard create, be-
tween them, a relationship of equality.
Id. at 29.
30. Id. at 28.
31. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 34.
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was elevated both economically and socially. If, on the other hand,
her husband struggled financially, she as the wife struggled as well.32
The black colonial woman, on the other hand, had little opportunity
for economic success as many black women and men were enslaved
during this period.33
The development of capitalism brought about great changes for
men. Men realized the ability to improve their social standing through
increased opportunities to earn wealth regardless of the social status
of their parents,34 whereas women continued to either climb or fall
depending on the economic success of her husband.
Although law reform provided women with some property rights
beginning in the mid-1800s,35 according to Evan Roberts ownership
did not give women the power to control property, only title to it.36
Without the power to actually control her property, a married woman
remained at the mercy of her husband despite many well intended
laws. In fact, there may have been a disincentive for a married woman
to enter the paid labor force, despite new laws, given the likelihood
that she would have little control over her own property. In addition,
“marriage imposed a set of rights and responsibilities on men and
32. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 14, at 76 (explaining that the “poverty of white women de-
rived largely from their marital status and lack of economic opportunities . . . . Adult white
women faced poverty if they did not wed, married a poor man, or lost their breadwinner.”).
33. Id. at 76.
34. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 104. Matthaei explains:
But as the family economy and slavery broke down, there were increasing
opportunities for individuals to earn wealth, regardless of the legacies of
their parents; the power of family ties to determine one’s economic position
gradually declined. The freeing of men from determination by their fathers
freed masculine self-seeking from the constraints of lineage and allowed it
to emerge as the dynamic motor of the new, capitalist economy.
Id.
35. Roberts, supra note 23, at 111 (“Until 1857 no states gave women explicit title to
their earnings from labor or business.”)
36. Id. at 108. Roberts maintains:
This distinction between ownership and control persisted through the nine-
teenth century reforms to married women’s property rights. Some acts pur-
ported to give wives ownership or title, but not management or control of
assets. It is a distinction that may appear odd to economists, in particular,
as an operating assumption of many economic analyses is that ownership
of assets implies control over their use and sale. In the legal realm the dis-
tinction was advocated as a way of giving wives title to assets, but without
interfering unduly with her husband’s day-to-day authority over the house-
hold. More concretely, laws which attempted to separate ownership from
control restricted husbands’ ability to sell property. Wives had the final say
in the continued ownership of assets. However, on a day-to-day basis a hus-
band was presumed to be in charge of managing the asset.
Id.
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women that were unequal and hierarchical, within the household.”37
The subordination of a wife to her husband was supported by society,
as well as our courts.
The female experience during the development of industrial
capitalism in America varied depending on her husband’s economic
status, as well as her race. Although the number of children born to
a woman in 1900 was dramatically fewer than those born to a woman
in 1800 (3.5 compared with an average of 7.04),38 many women con-
tinued to be tied to the home. For example, between 1860 and 1900
a relatively small number of married women, ranging from 4.1 and
4.6 percent, participated in the labor force.39 For many white women
the new focus was on raising the children, not just simply physically
producing more children to work to sustain the family.40
This period not only restricted the wife to the “domestic sphere,”
but also solidified the notion that homemaking was a “social voca-
tion reserved exclusively for woman.”41 Moreover, “the sexual division
of labor became more consistent and clear as men and women gained
distinct spheres of work, economy and family respectively.”42 Hence,
the home became the exclusive work sphere for most white women.
Although the percentage of married women in the labor force
by 1900 would be considered relatively small by today’s standards
(5.6 percent), historians suggest that the number is not insignificant
(approximately one million women).43 Yet the earnings of married
women were meager, in fact, they were lower than the earnings of
employed children.44 It is doubtful, however, that wage disparity
37. Roberts, supra note 23, at 116 (“The decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in 1888
summarized marital service as ‘the duty of the wife,’ as a helpmeet, to attend without
compe nsation all ordinary household duties, and labor faithfully to advance her hus-
band’s interests.”).
38. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 169. Matthaei maintains:
One of the clearest expressions of the transformation of mothering to a social
process was the decrease in average family size through the nineteen cen-
tury. In the course of the nineteenth century, the average number of children
per (white) woman fell by half, from 7.04 in 1800 to 3.56 in 1900. The reduc-
tion in and control over the number of children she bore was integral to
woman’s enlightened practice of her mothering vocation.
Id.
39. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 100.
40. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 108.
41. Id. at 112.
42. Id. at 114–15.
43. Martha Norby Fraundorf, The Labor Force Participation of Turn-of-the-Century
Married Women, 39 J. ECON. HIST. 401, 401 (1979).
44. Id. at 404 (“[A]mong families surveyed in 1901, the average earnings of employed
wives were $128.52, whereas employed children earned an average of $199.15.”).
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was the primary reason why married women during this period were
less likely to enter the labor force if they had employable children.45
In fact, social pressure, traditional views, and the availability of
work that could be accomplished within the home may have been
the greatest reasons married women remained at home.46
Not all women, however, remained outside the labor force. Age,
marital status, race, and finances played an important role in the
activity of women in the workforce. Not surprisingly, there tended to
be a higher rate of employment among single white girls of poor fam-
ilies during this period.47 These unmarried young women were likely
to seek employment to assist their families during their youth.48 Yet
most of these young women were inclined to terminate their em-
ployment upon marriage.49 The employment of young girls did not,
however, place them in a position of equality with their male coun-
terparts given the nature of the work available to women at the time.50
Women typically entered the labor force at a young age as low-level
factory workers.51 Many of these young girls did not personally bene-
fit from their efforts nor did their entry into the labor force provide
them with the promise of a better life.52 The little they did earn was
typically given to their parents in order to aid in the survival of the
45. Id. at 405 (“The turn-of-the-century wife seems to have entered the labor force
only if the family had no unemployed children of working age at home. Thus, women
worked when there were no children or until the children were old enough to enter the
labor force.”).
46. Id. at 406.
47. See Deborah M. Figart, et al., Breadwinners and Other Workers: Gender and
Race-Ethnicity in the Evolution of the Labor Force, in WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 39
(Ellen Mutari & Deborah M. Figart, eds., 2003) (explaining that “some of the pioneers
in waged work were young, white, single daughters of farm families”).
48. Id. at 40.
49. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP 12 (1990) (“For most of
our history, women exited the labor force at the time of marriage, rather than with
pregnancy, and their exit was, more often than not, final”); see also MATTHAEI, supra
note 10, at 127. According to Matthaei:
The employment of children, including daughters, in support of their fam-
ilies meant relatively high labor-force participation rate for single women.
In 1890, over 40 [percent] of single women were in the labor force, many of
them helping their mothers to remain in the home . . . Among women in the
working class, the life-work cycle was most often employment in childhood
or adolescence, which would be terminated at marriage.
Id.; WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40 (“A young girl from a family of
modest means might spend a few years contributing to her family’s income before she
got married.”).
50. WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40.
51. Id.
52. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 146–47.
2014] FINANCIAL FREEDOM 349
family.53 In fact, some young girls were put to work to pay for the
education and upward mobility of their brothers.54 Their work did
not gain them a career, only support for their parents and siblings.55
In addition, girls were socialized to pursue marriage as an ultimate
goal.56 Once they were married off they would exit the labor force to
become a mother and homemaker.57
In the alternative, black women tended to enter the labor force
at much higher rates during this period, “even when economic and
demographic variables were controlled . . . .”58 Experts maintain
that black wives were more likely to respond to poverty by entering
the labor force due, in part, to “[s]lavery and its heritage of racism
[which] worked against the establishment of a domestic ideal of
womanhood in the black family by excluding the black man from the
white conception of manhood. . . .”59 Thus, unlike white wives, who
were more likely to send their young daughters to work rather than
work themselves, black married women worked.60
Yet, given her limited employment choices and low rate of pay,
the black woman’s entry into the workforce did not place her in any
better position than the white working girl.61 Her employment did
not create economic security or a position of equality within her
53. Id. at 146–47. According to Matthaei:
Family poverty forced girls into the mills where they worked as daughters,
sending back their meager pay to aid their families. They were not independent
young women seeking their fortunes, but rather poor and burdened daugh-
ters . . . . The phenomenon of the working girls did not disappear when
factories moved to the cities. An 1880 study of 1,032 Working Girls of Boston
found that 90 [percent] were unmarried. Interviews of the girls’ families
revealed insufficiencies in the fathers’ incomes and the dependence of the
families on their daughters’ earnings . . . . [A] 1927 study of The Young
Employed Girl interviewed 500 of Philadelphia’s 3,867 working girls aged
fourteen to sixteen years and visited 263 of their homes. All but ten of these
girls turned their entire paychecks over to their families. Of the 263 families
interviewed, 209 were in dire need of income—half because of death or ill-
ness of parents, the other half because the father’s income was simply insuf-
ficient to buy necessities for the family.
Id. at 146–47.
54. Id. at 149.
55. Id. at 146–47, 149.
56. Id. at 147–48.
57. GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 12.
58. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, 134.
59. Id. at 134; see also WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40–41 (“The
dominant (or hegemonic) model of gender relations—based on a male breadwinner and
a female, full-time homemaker—never became the norm for African American women;”
based, in part, on this heritage of slavery which made it difficult for most African American
men to earn enough to support their families.).
60. WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40.
61. GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 27.
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marital relationship.62 In fact, given the resentment some black hus-
bands felt as a result of their wives’ entry into the labor force,63 black
women may have been placed at greater risk of harm.
The belief that females should be educated gained some accep-
tance despite its difficult beginnings. The education of women during
the nineteenth century was based, in part, on the notion that chil-
dren would benefit from the education of their mothers and that an
educated man would be greatly benefited if his wife was educated
as well.64 As the education of women garnered greater acceptance it
became clear, however, that they would not be armed with the tools
necessary to compete with men in the labor force.65 If a woman was
fortunate enough to receive education and training, she was steered
into areas that were closely connected to the role of mother and
homemaker, such as teacher or nurse, and later social worker or
librarian, all of which were accepted as inherently female careers.66
This early “sex-typing” of jobs, those careers inherently con-
sidered female (teaching, nursing, clerical, and social work) and those
considered male (the law, medicine, management, and sales), influ-
enced the career path of women, their social status, and their eco-
nomic circumstances.67 Not surprisingly, jobs that were considered
inherently female were lower status and lower pay than those con-
sidered inherently male.68 For the most part, women were precluded
from obtaining male jobs.69
Equally problematic for women in the nineteenth century was
their lack of property rights. Even if a married woman was able to
obtain a job, she had no legal claim to the wages she earned.70 A
woman’s husband was free to take her wages and use them as he
saw fit.71 The law was a valuable tool for men who were inclined to
62. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 136.
63. Id. at 136. Although Matthaei does not consider the issue from an “at risk” or inti-
mate partner violence perspective, she does provide important insight into both the black
woman’s employment experience and her husband’s reaction to it. Matthaei theorizes that
“[h]er efforts to help her husband and family were . . . resented as depriving her husband
of his manhood, his ability to provide. Slavery and racism have prevented many black
men from achieving masculinity and encouraged black women to share man’s role. Yet
this has not meant liberation of the sexes, but rather anger, mistrust, and a weakened
marital bond.”
64. Id. at 178–79.
65. Id. at 187–88.
66. Id. at 179, 183.
67. For examples of sex-typed jobs in 1900, see id. at 190–91.
68. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 192; Desirae M. Domenico & Karen H. Jones, Career
Aspirations of Women in the 20th Century, 22 J. CAREER & TECHNICAL EDUC. 18, 18 (2006).
69. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 192.
70. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 108.
71. Id.
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dominate their wives. The ability of a husband to take possession of
his wife’s livelihood also provided him with the power to control her
actions. Thus, a husband had the power to control and restrict his
wife through the power of the purse.
Although women were eventually granted property rights, their
role in the labor force in the 1900s was mixed.72 Due to economic ne-
cessity caused by the Great Depression and the needs of our country
as a result of war, more and more married women entered the labor
force.73 Yet husbands continued to resist the employment of their
wives, and as a product of their environment, wives resisted as
well.74 Some husbands openly declared that they would rather have
their family live in abject poverty than allow their wives to work.75
Notwithstanding this resistance, “[b]etween 1890 and 1920, women’s
participation in the paid professions increased by 226 [percent].”76
Not surprisingly, for many women marriage and employment
were incompatible,77 confirming that marriage continued to nega-
tively influence the employment of women. In fact, marital status
was one of the best predictors of whether a woman was a member
of the labor force.78 If she was unmarried it was more likely that she
worked for pay, if she was married it was more likely she did not.79
The numerical increase in the participation of women in the
paid labor force in the twentieth century was significant.80 But num-
bers alone provide limited information about paid female workers.
From the turn of the century through 1940 our country witnessed
significant increases in the rate of working married women.81 One
72. Id. at 100.
73. GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 10.
74. Comments by Alicia Kelly, Faculty Workshop: Works in Progress held at Widener
University School of Law (Feb. 21, 2013).
75. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 249. Explaining that:
A study of unemployed men during the 1930s found them (1) emotionally
devastated over the loss of their provider role and (2) adamantly opposed to
the employment of their wives. “I would rather starve than let my wife work,”
and “I would rather turn on the gas and put an end to the whole family than
let my wife support me.” These cases show how much a man’s masculinity
was bound up with his ability to provide for the family.
Id.
76. Id. at 257.
77. See WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40 (explaining that both cul-
tural norms, as well as employer policies to fire their female employees upon marriage
contributed to this “cult of domesticity”).
78. See id. at 40. See also MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 120–21.
79. See MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 262–63, 271.
80. See id. at 257.
81. See James P. Smith & Michael P. Ward, Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor
Force, 3 J. LABOR ECON. S59, S59 (1985) (maintaining that during the first forty years
of the 21st century “participation rates for married white women increased fivefold”).
352 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:339
factor accounting for the growth generally related to education.82
Although the least educated women were the most likely to work
prior to the turn of the century, increased education had a positive
correlation with the participation of women in paid labor in the
twentieth century.83 For example, high school educated women were
more likely to obtain clerical jobs which required particularized
skills.84 In fact, by the early 1900s it was typical for a young woman
to obtain a high school education,85 and by the 1940s college was
possible for some women, particularly for those from middle-class
families.86 Yet, during this period clerical work was the standard
occupation for a large majority of female workers.87
Some researchers point out the benefits of clerical work for mar-
ried women, in particular, because a mother could more easily leave
and re-enter a clerical job with fewer negative consequences.88 This
may be true to the extent that there was little mobility for indivi-
duals employed in clerical positions. Nevertheless, these positions
were inferior to “male jobs” which provided opportunity for advance-
ment. Indeed, women could find positions as clerical employees dur-
ing this period.89 These jobs were in large supply and they were the
catalyst for increasing the female labor force.90 A mother had the
flexibility to leave a clerical job to stay home with a young child and
return to a similar job with minimal, if any, loss of status or pay
grade.91 This suggests, however, that had that same mother re-
mained at her job and not stayed home to care for her young chil-
dren, she would have experienced little advancement during that
period of employment.
82. Id. at S70.
83. Id.
84. Kim England & Kate Boyer, Women’s Work: The Feminization and Shifting
Meanings of Clerical Work, 43 J. SOCIAL HIST. 307, 313 (2009).
85. Smith & Ward, supra note 81, at S76. Smith and Ward explain:
Between the 1981 and 1921 birth years, universal high school attendance
became the norm. Not only did schooling increase rapidly over this period,
but, with the development of the high school, the character of women’s
schooling was altered, with the learning acquired presumably more useful
in the labor market.
Id.
86. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 262. Mattaei provides:
By 1940, a survey of the middle-class readers of Woman’s Home Companion
found that although all but one saw marriage as their ultimate career goal,
75 percent of the high school girls wished to go to college, and 98 percent
wished to pursue a brief business or professional career before they married.
Id.
87. See Smith & Ward, supra note 81, at S78.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., England & Boyer, supra note 84, at 312.
90. Id.
91. See Smith & Ward, supra note 81, at S78.
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In the twenty years following 1950, a rapid growth in the labor
force participation of women resulted in a fifty percent increase in
female workers.92 Employment, however, continued to be a short-term
experience, ending when a woman married.93 Marriage was expected
and employment was not necessarily acceptable after marriage.94 Of
all the factors to be considered, some researchers suggest that “only
material status matters” when assessing female participation in the
labor force, with marriage acting as a “depressant.”95
In addition, job sex-typing dominated through the 1960s, keep-
ing females who did work in a compromised economic position.96
Women held lower status jobs, typically in a supporting role to male
employees.97 They worked as secretaries and in clerical positions. In
fact, “by 1960 almost one of every three employed women worked in
clerical jobs as opposed to one in a hundred in 1870.”98 Additionally,
more women worked in manufacturing in the 1960s than in any
other industry.99 These low-level jobs were similar to the clerical
positions of the early 1900s, providing little room for promotion or
advancement.100 Simply put, working women played a supportive
role to men and male-run businesses.101
The 1970s and 1980s provided women with greater opportuni-
ties for advancement.102 Indeed, during this period much progress
was made in integrating women into many occupational fields.103
Yet during this period women continued to earn less than their male
counterparts.104 According to Claudia Goldin, “in the 1970’s, the 59
cents on the dollar figure became synonymous with inequality be-
tween men and women in the labor market. It symbolized the failure
92. See id. at S59.
93. Desirae M. Domenico & Karen H. Jones, Career Aspirations of Women in the 20th
Century, 22 J. CAREER & TECHNICAL EDUC. 18, 19 (2007).
94. Id.
95. See Smith & Ward, supra note 81, at S81.
96. MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 197.
97. See id. at 208–09.
98. Id. at 282.
99. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Spotlight on Statistics: Women at Work (Mar.
2011), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2011/women/ [hereinafter Women at Work].
100. SHARON L. HARLAN & CATHERINE WHITE BERHEIDE, CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV’T,
BARRIERS TO WORK PLACE ADVANCEMENT EXPERIENCED BY WOMEN IN LOW-PAYING
OCCUPATIONS 4 (1994).
101. See MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 207–09, 222–23.
102. See ARIANE HEGEWISCH ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, SEPARATE
AND NOT EQUAL? GENDER SEGREGATION IN THE LABOR MARKET AND THE GENDER WAGE
GAP 1 (2010).
103. Id.
104. GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 83.
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of the marketplace to ensure equal treatment and became a banner
for the women’s movement.”105
By 1979, the female-to-male earnings ratio had moved very
little—holding at an unsatisfactory sixty-two percent.106 The re-
duced earning capacity of women during this period was due, in
part, to the lower educational attainment of women.107 For example,
in 1970 only eleven percent of women held a college degree.108 By
1980 the number jumped to 18.7 percent.109 Although early wage
disparity between the sexes could be justified, at least in part, by
taking into account the youth and inexperience of some female
workers,110 it is difficult to understand how wage differences con-
tinued to exist over time in the face of advancements in education,
as well as the experience women gained on the job over time.111 One
explanation for “wage discrimination” is rooted in the continuing
discrimination of women based on their gender alone.112 Compound-
ing the problem is the long-lasting influence of the early sex-typing
in the labor force and the socialization of both girls and boys begin-
ning at an early age.113
105. Id. at 83.
106. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Women’s-to-Men’s Earnings Ratio by Age (July
2010), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100708.htm; see also STEVEN GREENHOUSE,
THE BIG SQUEEZE 39 (2008) (suggesting similar statistics on wage disparity during this
period).
107. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Educational Attainment of Women in the Labor
Force, 1970–2010 (Dec. 2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20111229.htm.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. But see GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 92 (questioning whether wage disparity around
the turn of the century was due to age and inexperience of female workers or due to
“wage discrimination”).
111. In fact, some argue that wage discrimination increased as the education and job
experience of women increased. GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 83.
112. See GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 88. Goldin explains:
The measure of “wage discrimination” and the word “discrimination” are not
necessarily the same concepts. By discrimination or prejudice, we often mean
a distaste for associating with another person because of some characteristic
unrelated to intrinsic aspects of productivity. Alternatively, discrimination can
occur because an individual is part of a group—say, all women or all blacks—
having average characteristics that differ from those of another group—say,
all men or all whites. . . . [This is] generally termed “taste discrimination.” . . .
[the other] [i]s called “statistical discrimination” . . . . [I]n statistical discrim-
ination, for example, the groups need not differ by characteristics related to
productivity. They may, however, differ by the ability of others to infer pro-
ductivity from an attribute such as education [citation omitted]. The groups,
if they do differ in ability or education or skill, need not differ by much, but
small initial differences can, through feedback effects, lead to large differ-
ences over time.
Id.
113. See id. at 90.
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A woman who attempted to obtain employment for a position
which was traditionally seen as “male” faced many difficulties.114 In
addition, the view that a woman should or could support herself
financially was not widespread.115 Culturally, men were still seen as
the breadwinners and women as the caretakers.116 These social
norms equated to real dollars for working wives who continued to
earn less than their working husbands.117 In fact, according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, by 1987 only eighteen percent of working
wives earned more than their working husbands118. Given social
norms and the reality that working wives continued to earn less
than their husbands, many married women persisted in leaving the
labor force upon the birth of a child.119 Although having one spouse
remain home provided benefits, the decision placed women in a
vulnerable position.120
Studies suggest that married women during this period were
“trapped in a ‘low wage’ cycle.”121 Researchers James Long and Ethel
Jones explain that in the 1970s married women’s wages tended to
be low given their lack of experience compared to “men and their
low current earning capacity reduce[d] the probability of entering
the labor force in the future, which in turn reduced their expected
future wages.”122 This “low wage cycle” may accurately characterize
the plight of many stay-at-home wives, in particular those in abu-
sive relationships.123
Some might argue that women’s experiences are very different
today, that women generally have an equal opportunity to support
themselves financially. Yet, research suggests that although there
were some advancements both in the integration of women into the
workforce and some narrowing of the wage gap during the 1970s and
1980s, little to no progress has been made since the mid-1990s.124
114. See MATTHAEI, supra note 10, at 287–88.
115. See id. at 279.
116. See WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 47, at 40.
117. See id. at 155–57.
118. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Wives Who Earn More than Their Husbands,
1987–2011 (Jan. 2009) http://www.bls.gov/cps/wives_earn_more.xls.
119. See Annemette Sorensen, Women’s Employment Patterns After Marriage, 45 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 311, 316 (1983).
120. See James E. Long & Ethel B. Jones, Labor Force Entry and Exit by Married
Women: A Longitudinal Analysis, 62 REV. ECON & STAT. 1, 6 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic
Rights, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 188 (2003).
124. Hegewisch, supra note 102, at 1.
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Accordingly, women today continue to have diminished oppor-
tunities and limited choices.125 Not only do they earn less than their
male counterparts in the paid labor force, our history of job sex-
typing continues to reduce the employment opportunities of female
workers.126 Moreover, women generally represent a much larger
percentage of the poor, the homeless, and the abused.127
Sex-typing, wage disparity, gender bias, socialization, marriage,
and children significantly influence the ability of women generally
to prosper in the labor force.128 With a basic understanding of the
economic implications of these challenges we now turn to the “piling
on” effect of intimate partner violence when added to the preceding
economic factors.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:
THE POWER TO CONTROL
Inadequate material resources render women more
vulnerable to violence. Inadequate material re-
sources increase the batterers’ access to women who
do try to separate. Inadequate material resources
are a primary reason why women do not try to
separate . . . [T]hose women who are economically
vulnerable have an increased vulnerability to
violence. So you see this kind of interactive effect.129
For survivors of intimate partner violence, there are a number
of barriers that dramatically decrease the likelihood of freeing one-
self from the cycle of abuse and remaining safely away from an abu-
sive partner.130 These factors include, but are not limited to, risk of
harm, social factors, law enforcement response, system’s response,
economic dependence, homelessness, and poverty.131 The latter three
factors fall into the broader category of financial impediments to
freedom from abuse.132
125. Id. at 1–2.
126. For a detailed discussion of the current state of labor equality for women, see
infra Part IV.B.
127. Introduction to the Challenges for Achieving Gender Equality, GLOBAL POVERTY
PROJECT (May 2, 2013), http://www.globalcitizen.org/Content/Content.aspx?id=058f8fee
-01f4-4508-a54d-464ff22a4716.
128. See GOLDIN, supra note 49, at 159.
129. Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 187–88.
132. Id. at 188.
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Financial impediments play a major role in restricting a woman
who experiences intimate partner violence from initially gaining
freedom from the abusive relationship.133 Moreover, financial insta-
bility is one of the greatest reasons why, after gaining freedom, a
woman has limited choices and may ultimately acquiesce to an abus-
er’s attempts at reconciliation.134 Advocates agree that for many
women it comes down to a choice between ensuring resources for
their children and freedom from abuse.135 The choice is clear for
many women—feed, house, and clothe the children, even if it com-
promises her safety.136
Unlike stranger violence, batterers are able to successfully es-
tablish and maintain a long-term relationship with their partners
due to both entrapment and control.137 Although the source of the
batterer’s success at drawing in and maintaining control over his
intimate partner remains unsettled, it is generally accepted that
batterers create an emotional connection with their victim, as well
as use a variety of tactics to entrap her. Although all abusive rela-
tionships are unique, a batterer’s behavior typically cycles through
various stages.138 For example, the “cycle of violence” has been used
to describe these patterns of behavior.139 The cycle of violence model
suggests that the violent relationships follow a three stage pattern:
(1) tension building, (2) explosion, and (3) the honeymoon phase.140
Although not all abusive relationships follow a precise cycle,
batterers use varying degrees of abusive and loving tactics to ter-
rorize and entrap their partner.141 An individual whose power rests
solely on physical acts of abuse and intimidation will likely have
little success maintaining a lasting relationship with his intimate
partner.142 Often, there are additional links that tie a woman to her
abusive partner and draw her back again and again should she
break free.143
133. Id.
134. See Ashley Lowe & Sarah R. Prout, Economic Justice in Domestic Violence
Litigation, 90 MICH. BAR J. 32, 33 (2011).
135. Id.
136. Id. (explaining that many battered women remain in the abusive relationship in
order to provide food and shelter for their children).
137. Id. at 32–33.
138. See, e.g., Dating Violence 101, BREAK THE CYCLE, http://www.breakthecycle.org
/dating-violence-101?gclid=CMDYq-vCwbECFQhN4AodI2EAHg (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Tactics of Abusive Men, CRISIS CONNECTION, http://www.crisisconnectioninc.org
/domesticviolence/tactics_of_abusive_men.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
142. Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32–33.
143. Id.
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Having children in common connects two individuals for the
long-term. Yet, having a child in common alone does not guarantee
the continuation of the intimate relationship. In contrast, economic
insecurity creates lasting dependence, enabling the abuser to draw
his partner into the abusive relationship over and over again.
While financial dependence entraps a woman who is abused,
other forms of economic abuse provide the batterer with added power
to control her actions.144 The economic dependence of the victim en-
ables the batterer to hold his hostage indefinitely.145 Hostage taking,
however, is only part of the problem. Once trapped, the perpetrator
is able to control his partner through a variety of abusive tactics.146
Batterers threaten, intimidate, use physical force, engage in sexual
violence, and psychologically abuse.147 Hence, abuse and money are
intensely interconnected. The examples are unlimited: control over
money is used as a tool to commit other acts of abuse, control over
money is used to hold the victim hostage, abuse takes the form of
money control, and so much more.
Money, power, and domestic violence intersect in a variety of
ways.148 Economics may influence the batterer’s personality charac-
teristics, guarantee the formation of the abusive relationship, fuel
the batterer’s power, or take the form of specific acts of abuse.149 For
some abusers financial control is accomplished through a calculated
process of seeking out and nurturing a relationship with an individ-
ual of compromised means.150 Other abusers spend years restricting
their partner’s access to education, employment, training, contacts,
and resources, thereby limiting her ability to secure financial free-
dom once the abuse begins.151
144. Id.
145. Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32–33.
146. Id.




151. CYNTHIA K. SANDERS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ECONOMIC ABUSE, AND IMPLICATIONS
OF A PROGRAM FOR BUILDING ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN: FINDINGS
FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PARTICIPANTS IN A WOMEN’S ECONOMIC ACTION PROGRAM 36
(2007), available at http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/RP07-12.pdf. Sanders
explained that one of the themes to emerge from her survey of battered women was:
the prevention or disruption of employment and education by [abusive]
partners. In some cases partners simply prohibited and threatened violence
if women expressed a desire to work or gain further education. In other cases
partners used tactics to disrupt employment or education. Tactics included
initiating conflict just before women were leaving for a job interview or class,
calling and harassing women at work or showing up at school or place of
employment and causing a scene; in some cases causing women to lose their
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A. Targeting
Batterers often use the political and economic vul-
nerability of women to reinforce their power and
dominance over particular women . . . . Batterers
also take advantage of the vulnerabilities of their
victims, such as the victim’s economic dependence
on the batterer or on the state, her status as an ille-
gal immigrant, her alcohol or drug dependency, or
her responsibility to provide and care for children.152
Although it is generally accepted that women of all socioeconomic
groups are at risk of experiencing domestic violence,153 batterers can
be calculating when it comes to victimization.154 Particularized quali-
ties may make a potential victim more appealing or less tempting to
a batterer, economic instability representing one of the more appeal-
ing qualities.155 Targeting an individual of limited finances is there-
fore ideal for a batterer because it creates the ultimate dependent
relationship.156 Moreover, women in poverty experience multiple vul-
nerabilities, which have a causal relationship with economic hardship
such as single-parenthood, homelessness, diminished social capital,
compromised immigration status, and language barriers.157 One or
several hardships coupled with economic insecurity makes women in
poverty ideal targets for perpetrators of intimate partner violence.158
An individual with few resources is likely to more freely rely on
an intimate partner for her needs, as well as the needs of her chil-
dren.159 Not only will an individual of limited financial means more
readily become dependent upon an abuser, it is also likely that she
will face greater challenges in her attempts to end the violent rela-
tionship once she becomes intimately involved with an abuser.160 In
jobs. Such tactics interfered with women’s efforts to advance their economic
well-being and stability.
Id.
152. SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for
Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1999)).
153. J. Michael Collins & Collin O’Rourke, FAM. FIN. EDUC., Financial Capability and
Domestic Violence, at 1, Feb. 2012, available at http://fyi.uwex.edu/financialseries/files/2012
/02/Financial-Capability-and-Domestic-Violence.pdf.
154. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 12.
155. Id.
156. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188 (“Some battering men appear to seek out women
that are economically vulnerable . . . .”).
157. Id. at 187.
158. Id. at 187–88.
159. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 33.
160. Id. at 32.
360 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:339
fact, she may even be reluctant to try to terminate the relationship
once the abuse begins given the limited options available to her.161
Economic instability, however, does not translate to weaknesses
on the part of a woman who is abused. It is a common misconception
that women who are battered are weak individuals who possess
personality flaws placing them at greater risk.162 To the contrary,
domestic violence experts generally agree that women in violent
relationships are often strong survivors.163 In fact, both flaws with
our legal system and the acts of batterers perpetuate intimate part-
ner violence, not battered women.164 Armed with proper resources,
a “would be victim” is less appealing to a batterer whose power to con-
trol is greatly diminished by the economic stability of his partner.165
Yet, ensuring economic stability for women is a difficult task given
the complex nature of the female labor force experience,166 the flaws
in our current legal system,167 gender norms,168 and the lack of gov-
ernment resources available generally.169
B. Entrapment
In domestic captivity, physical barriers to escape are
rare. In most homes, even the most oppressive, there
are no bars on the windows, no barbed wire fences.
Women and children are not ordinarily chained,
though even this occurs more often than one might
think. The barriers to escape are generally invisible.
They are nonetheless extremely powerful.170
Entrapment is another way an abuser uses economics to ensure
power over his victim.171 The ability of the abuser to prevent his victim
from acquiring resources, another category of economic abuse, is an
161. Id. at 33.
162. Violence and Domestic Abuse-Myths and Facts, THE WOMEN’S CTR., http://www
.thewomenscenter.org/content.asp?contentid=537 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
163. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 18 (1988).
164. Id. at 11–25 (arguing that sources of help are not readily available to battered
women, entrapping them in violent relationships).
165. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 34.
166. See supra Part I.
167. See infra Part III.
168. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy
for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39–41 (1999)).
169. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
170. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 74 (1992).
171. See STARK, supra note 1, at 129.
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effective way to maintain long-term control.172 Abusers use a multi-
tude of tactics to compromise the victim’s employment or education
status, guaranteeing the battered woman’s dependence upon him.173
The findings from one survey of a group of women from abusive
relationships support the notion that a batterer’s control over family
finances strengthens his power to control.174 Although the responses
to the survey varied, it is clear that economic instability “played a
major role” in the women’s struggle to achieve freedom from the
abusive relationship.175 For example, one respondent explained that
without financial security it is difficult to leave an abusive relation-
ship, particularly when there are children involved.176
Some batterers contact their partner at her job, cause her to be
late for or miss work, or use other abusive tactics to interfere with
her employment status.177 For example, three survey participants
provided similar examples of the tactics used by the abusers to cause
problems with her employment.178 One survey participant explained
that her abuser would come to her workplace and use profanity in an
attempt to embarrass her; another claimed that her abuser would
call and harass her on the job resulting in the termination of her
employment; while another maintained that her abuser “would come
to my work . . . and start trouble. Cussing and screaming and throw-
ing a hissy fit . . . .”179 A second survey participant also explained that
172. See Coker, supra note 123, at 196.
173. See, e.g., Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32–33. Explaining:
It is common for batterers to insist that a survivor quit working to continue
the batterer’s campaign of physical and financial isolation. It is also com-
mon for a batterer to sabotage efforts at maintaining employment before
and after separation as outside interests and sources of income threaten a
batterer’s control over his partner. This fulfills the batterer’s short-term and
long-term goals, forcing his spouse to focus solely on his needs. Additionally,
this behavior further helps establish long-term dependence on the relation-
ship by sabotaging the survivor’s ability to earn a paycheck.
Id.; see also Coker, supra note 123, at 188 (“Abusive men cause women to lose jobs,
educational opportunities, careers, homes, savings, their health, their ability to enter the
workplace.”).
174. SANDERS, supra note 151, at 42. Explaining that:
Women’s access to financial resources were often restricted, monitored, or
completely controlled by an abusive partner. Financial issues were routinely
an impetus to other forms of abuse including physical, sexual, and verbal.
Women often felt unable to leave abusive partners due to economic depen-
dence, especially when they had children to care for.
Id.
175. Id. at 34.
176. Id. (“A lot of times it’s [economic dependence] why we stay is because there’s no
way out. With four kids . . . I love my kids . . . where would I take them? I’m not gonna
live in a car. Where am I gonna go? . . . They got to be able to go to school . . . .”).
177. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32.
178. SANDERS, supra note 151, at 34, 37.
179. Id. at 37.
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she was only permitted to work when it benefitted her abuser: “[I]f
he was in between jobs and we needed money,” she was permitted
to work.180
According to Linda Brush, “[w]ork is a particularly important
site for contesting the vulnerability of women to men’s abuse . . .
Interfering with women’s work and education is a specific tactic
abusers use to exploit and control women.”181 By interfering with his
partner’s labor force participation, a perpetrator succeeds in di-
minishing his partner’s chances of financial independence.182 The
damage to work history that follows these acts of labor-force-abuse
causes long-lasting negative implications for women that follow
them throughout their careers.183
C. Abuse
Individual men’s establishing coercive control over
their wives and girlfriends is not rooted in any-
thing natural about masculinity, but is backed by
political, economic, and social inequalities.184
Economic abuse is one of several strategies used by the batterer
to gain control over his partner, yet it is a form of domestic violence
that is very different from physical abuse or threats of harm.185 This
type of abuse presents significant challenges for survivors who seek
legal protections because the perpetrator’s acts seldom fall neatly
into an enumerated category of abuse as defined by law.186
1. Resource Control
To make contemporary women their personal
property, the modern man must effectively stand
against the tide of history, degrading women into
a position of subservience that the progress of civi-
lization has made obsolete. But he must do even
more . . . . [T]he technology of control men devise
must be equally expansive in time and social space,
180. Id.
181. LISA BRUSH, POVERTY, BATTERED WOMEN, AND WORK IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY
32 (2011).
182. Id. at 31–32.
183. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 36–37.
184. See BRUSH, supra note 181, at 32.
185. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 31.
186. See BRUSH, supra note 181, at 32.
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reaching into the economic, political, and social
realms to which women’s freedoms have given
them access . . . .187
Batterers who use resource control to abuse and ultimately
control their intimate partners may employ several strategies to
accomplish their goals.188 Legal scholars suggest that preventing an
intimate partner from “acquiring” and “using” resources are two
forms of economic abuse.189
The legal system’s recognition of economic abuse, however, has
been mixed.190 Given our tendency to focus on specific acts of phys-
ical abuse or threats of harm, as opposed to a course of conduct, it
has been difficult for individuals seeking protection to establish that
acts of economic abuse justify the entry of a civil protection order.191
Resource control is one of the many ways in which money and
domestic violence connect.192 Male entitlement of female property is
rooted in early American history,193 and although laws have long been
established to ensure the property rights of women, male domina-
tion over money and possessions continues to fuel intimate partner
violence.194 Marriage is the batterer’s gateway to establishing power
over the family finances and property.195 Although unmarried per-
petrators strive to control household resources, marriage is the ideal
environment for growing this power.196 Joint bank accounts, prop-
erty titled solely in the husband’s name, and limits on the victim’s
access to financial information are just some of the trouble areas.197
In addition, when marriage is involved it may appear to the objec-
tive observer that control of the assets was freely given to an abusive
spouse, making it very difficult for the abused partner to subse-
quently prove financial wrongdoing.
A batterer’s use of resource control can take many forms.198
Limiting a spouse’s access to money or property generally are
187. STARK, supra note 1, at 197.
188. See Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic Violence, 83
N.Y. ST. B.J. 40 (2011).
189. Id. at 41.
190. See Coker, supra note 123, at 189–90; Pollet, supra note 188, at 42.
191. The protections afforded via civil protection orders are explored infra Part III.
192. See Pollet, supra note 188, at 40.
193. Part I of this Article considers a husband’s authority to control the property of his
wife. See supra Part I.
194. See Pollet, supra note 188, at 41.
195. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 30–31.
196. Id. at 32.
197. Id. at 31.
198. Id. at 30.
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obvious examples.199 This form of abuse can be expressed at the
most basic level. Controlling the amount and type of food that the
victim or child is permitted to eat on a daily or weekly basis is one
example.200 Some abusers nearly starve their victims or excessively
restrict the nutritional content their family is allowed to consume
while others limit the amount of money or resources to which their
partner has access.201 The maltreated spouse may be given an ex-
ceedingly limited amount of money upon which she is expected to
feed her family, ultimately setting her up for failure, which the
perpetrator will later use to justify other abusive measures.202 Such
failure may also accomplish the abuser’s dual goal—to abuse his
partner and to compromise her relationship with the children.203
Restricting a partner’s use of specific possessions is another way
the batterer can maintain power over his victim through control of
the property.204 A batterer who removes the car battery or takes the
car keys with him as he leaves the home on his way to work each day
restricts his partner’s mobility, denies her freedom of association,
and compromises her safety.205 Likewise, disabling the home phone
or forbidding the use of a cell phone has similar outcomes.206
Moreover, a perpetrator may take retaliatory action if he is
arrested or otherwise removed from the home due to his acts of
domestic violence.207 His actions may take many forms to abuse and
control his victim beyond physical acts of violence or threats of
199. Id. at 30–31.
200. See NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Economic Abuse, http://www
.uncfsp.org/projects/userfiles/File/DCE-STOP_NOW/NCADV_Economic_Abuse_Fact
_Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
201. See, e.g., Cathy Hayes, Husband Found Guilty of Horrific Spousal Abuse, IRISH
CENTRAL (July 13, 2012), http://www.irishcentral.com/news/-Husband-found-guilty-of
-horrific-spousal-abuse---wife-found-gravely-ill-starved-blind--VIDEO-162336846.html.
202. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 33.
203. Experts in the area of intimate partner violence agree that perpetrators seek to
direct the child’s perception of and relationship with the abused parent. See LUNDY
BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 69 (2002). Bancroft and
Silverman explain:
[T]he typical ability of men who batter to shape the children’s views of both
parents and to condition children to misinterpret the abuse that they ob-
serve in a way that leads them to blame their mother and to minimize the
abuse. One study, for example, found that exposure to domestic violence
affected children’s views of their mother more negatively than it did their
views of their father.
Id.
204. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 39–40.
205. Id. at 40.
206. See CANADIAN RESOURCE CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Spousal Abuse, available
at http://crcvc.ca/docs/spousalabuse.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
207. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 184–85.
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harm.208 He may choose to freeze or liquidate a joint bank account,209
close joint credit card accounts, stop payments on the mortgage or
rent,210 refuse to pay the utility bill, terminate utility service to the
residence,211 shut off the phone, or refuse to pay the day care bill.212
As a result, the victim is literally left out in the cold. Homelessness,
poverty, and hunger lead to one option for many a survivor of do-
mestic violence—reunification with the abusive partner.213
Limited access to financial assets is particularly dangerous be-
cause it limits an individual’s ability to free herself from a violent
relationship or remain safely away once she takes measures to
end the relationship.214 Without money, it is exceedingly difficult to
physically leave the abusive home, pay a security deposit for an-
other residence, find and maintain employment, or feed herself and
her dependents.215
2. Exploitation
Another category of economic abuse identified by domestic vio-
lence scholars is the exploitation of the victim’s resources.216 Although
exploitation and resource control are interconnected, there are subtle
differences between the two forms of economic abuse.217 Exploitation
takes many forms: liquidating the bank accounts, charging items on
the victim’s credit card, and taking, damaging, or destroying the
208. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 30.
209. For many survivors, careful financial planning prior to termination of the abusive
relationship and/or application for a civil protection order is critical to ensuring that the
batterer does not have the opportunity to take financial retaliatory measures. The liqui-
dation of a bank account not only places the victim and her children in jeopardy of pov-
erty and homelessness, but also may limit her access to legal assistance if free or low cost
representation is not an option in her jurisdiction.
210. Domestic violence is one of the greatest causes of homelessness among women
and children. See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
64 (2005) available at http://www.usmayors.org/hungersurvey/2005/HH2005FINAL.pdf.
211. Based on the author’s nineteen years of representing battered individuals seeking
protection from abuse. Utility shut-off, particularly in the winter months, presents great
difficulties for survivors of intimate partner violence. Not only are utility companies slow
to respond, some works react with a clear lack of understanding of intimate partner vio-
lence. The author has found that without a good advocate, many battered individuals face
great difficulty reactivating utility service.
212. For battered women who are employed or seek employment subsequent to termi-
nation of the abusive relationship, lack of child care may result in lost wages or termina-
tion of their employment. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 30.
213. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 156–57.
214. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
215. Id.
216. Pollet, supra note 188, at 41.
217. Id.
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victim’s property.218 This problem is two-fold. Not only does the bat-
terer exploit the victim’s resources, he also destroys her credit in the
process.219 In turn, his victim’s dependence upon him increases. It
is clear that the fallout from credit problems can have long-term
implications. Damage to the victim’s credit score can decrease the
likelihood that she will be eligible for auto or education loans, af-
fordable housing, and other life necessities.220
Once the survivor’s credit is compromised it can take years for
an individual to repair her credit score.221 Because consumer report-
ing companies can report truthful negative information for seven
years and bankruptcy information for ten years,222 a survivor of
domestic violence with bad credit will suffer negative effects for
nearly a decade. A poor credit score results in higher interest on
credit cards and other loans, the increased likelihood that she will
be seen as a credit risk, as well as limited options, both personally
and professionally.223
Not only will a survivor of economic exploitation have a difficult
time securing stable housing and transportation, which affect labor
force participation, her employment success will be negatively influ-
enced in other ways as well.224 Her employment options will be greatly
reduced, as negative credit discourages would-be employers from hir-
ing her for a position that is entrusted with handling money.225 Retail,
store clerk, food service register employee, bank teller, payroll, or
office manager are just a few of the many labor force positions which
may be unavailable to a battered women with bad credit.
3. Destruction of Social Capital
The idea that money is the answer, no matter what
the question, has hijacked our collective soul.226
218. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 31–32, 34–35, 38–40.
219. Id. at 39.
220. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
221. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 56.
222. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,, Credit Repair: How to Help Yourself, http://ftc.gov/bcp
/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre13.shtm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
223. FED. TRADE COMM’N, How Credit Scores Affect the Price of Credit and Insurance,
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0152-how-credit-scores-affect-price-credit-and
-insurance (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
224. Peg J. Dierkers, All Too Common, Domestic Violence Is Still Preventable: As I See
it, PENNLIVE (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:15 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/10
/all_too_common_domestic_violence_is_still_preventable_as_i_see_it.html.
225. Gary Rivlin, The Long Shadow of Bad Credit in a Job Search, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/business/employers-pull-applicants
-credit-reports.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
226. See RON GALLEN, THE MONEY TRAP 5 (2002).
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Resources are not exclusively financial. The isolation of the
victim, which occurs frequently in intimate partner violence cases,
strengthens the batterer’s control.227 In turn, isolation promotes eco-
nomic insecurity in a variety of ways including but not limited to the
loss of social capital.228 According to Professor Moshe A. Milevsky,
“[s]ocial capital is loosely defined as the collection of networks, coop-
eration, relationship, norms, mutual aid, faith, and various other
forms of ‘glue’ that hold a community together.”229 Milevsky maintains
that social capital has “a profound impact on financial matters.”230
Specifically, the greater your social capital the less likely you are to
experience financial hardship.231
For women who are abused, strong community and family ties
ensure safety, weak ties promote risk.232 For a woman in a violent
relationship, social capital can take the form of family, friends,
neighbors, coworkers, as well as other individuals or organizations
in the community.233 Social capital can ensure a woman’s physical
safety, as well as her financial security.234 For example, if she flees
her abusive home in the middle of the night, a close relationship with
a neighbor may enable her to stay with that individual for a day or
even longer. That same neighbor may be more likely to intervene or
contact the police if an altercation occurs. Friends and family can
provide emotional support, as well as some of the material resources
necessary to help the victim end the violent relationship. Resources
227. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 33.
228. See MARK VISSER, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC STRAIN AND SOCIAL
ISOLATION 18 (2012).
229. See MOSHE A. MILEVSKY, YOUR MONEY MILESTONES: A GUIDE TO MAKING THE 9
MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL DECISIONS OF YOUR LIFE 108–09 (2010). Although Milevsky
does not consider social capital in the context of intimate partner violence, social capital
is critical to the safety of battered women.
230. Id. at 109.
231. Id. Milevsky explains:
The reality is that social capital also serves a smoothing function. How so?
If you live in a community or society with high social capital values, you are
much less likely to experience disruptions in your standard of living. Think
about the neighborhood or community where you live. If you happen to run
out of flower while baking a cake or need to jump-start your vehicle to get
to work one morning, how many neighbors within a short walking distance
would you feel comfortable borrowing the cup of flour or jumper cables from?
Id.
232. See Breaking Isolation: Domestic Abuse and Workplace Support, SELFEDUK,
http://www.selfed.org.uk/breaking-isolation-domestic-abuse-and-workplace-support (last
visited Jan. 10, 2014).
233. See SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR FORUM, The Definition of Social Capital, http://social
entrepreneurforum.com/index.php/tag/examples-of-social-capital/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2014).
234. See VISSER, supra note 228, at 18.
368 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:339
do not necessarily have to be in the form of actual dollars; the pro-
vision of temporary food, clothing, shelter, and emotional support
increase the odds of breaking free from the violent relationship.235
Yet perpetrators of intimate partner violence are well aware of
the value of social capital.236 It is not uncommon for a batterer to
completely restrict his partner’s contact with neighbors, friends, and
family members.237 This behavior may result from a desire to main-
tain total control over his partner, as well as to guarantee that she has
no support system. This loss of contact with family, friends, neigh-
bors, and former coworkers reinforces her financial dependence upon
her abuser.238
Restricting contact with others may cause a total loss of family
and community support.239 The destruction of social capital not only
reinforces the batterer’s control, it also creates other negative out-
comes for women in abusive relationships.240 Isolation prevents
“would-be” witnesses from observing injuries or acts of abuse, the
procurement of photographic evidence, calls to law enforcement, and
intervention by third parties. This in turn reduces the likelihood of
eyewitness testimony or physical evidence at trial to prove that acts
of abuse occurred. As a result, the likelihood that violence will be
prevented or halted is greatly diminished.241
Further, even when there are witnesses to the acts of abuse or
the aftermath, such as family, friends, and former co-workers, these
individuals may be reluctant or unwilling to testify on behalf of a
victim.242 Although some reluctance to testify may result from a fear
of retaliation, certain individuals may be unwilling to get involved,
in part, due to their weak ties to the victim.243
Batterers often control tangible resources to prevent their
partner from obtaining social capital.244 By restricting his partner
from using the vehicle or the phone for example, the batterer not
only prevents his partner from physically leaving or calling for help,
235. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
236. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 33.
237. Many of the clients I represent report that they have not had contact with family
members and friends for years due to the controlling nature of their batterer. In ad-
dition, many report that they have no relationship with or have never even spoken to
their neighbors.
238. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 33.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
242. See Sara J. Berman, Domestic Violence and Domestic Abuse, NOLO, http://www
.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/domestic-violence-33813.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
243. See Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
244. See SANDERS, supra note 151, at 33.
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he also increases her social isolation. Without a strong support
system, a woman who is abused will face great difficulties in her
struggle to access the resources necessary to end the violent rela-
tionship. What is more, should she succeed in breaking free from the
violence she will have no one to turn to for assistance when faced
with the financial hardships resulting from separation from the
abusive partner.
III. CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDERS (CPO)
The relationship between extreme poverty and vio-
lence against women is complex, yet we do know
that successful efforts to increase the safety of im-
poverished women must include strengthening their
ability to support themselves and their children.245
For many women in abusive relationships, there is little question
that a civil protection order (CPO) is a critical alternative remedy to
the criminal prosecution of the batterer.246 Experts maintain that
women who are battered tend to choose to file for civil protection
over other legal alternatives for a variety of reasons.247 Not only is
245. Patricia Cole & Sarah M. Buel, Safety and Financial Security for Battered Women:
Necessary Steps for Transitioning from Welfare to Work, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
307, 309 (2000).
246. For an analysis of the differences between civil protection from abuse orders and
criminal prosecution, see Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using The Stages of
Change Model to Realize The Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303,
320 (2011).
247. Id. at 318–21. Stoever provides:
Figure 1: Although many people conflate civil protection orders and crim-
inal restraining orders, there are essential distinctions that make protection
orders a more attractive option for many individuals. First, a civil protection
order case is a survivor’s own case, not the government’s. The survivor defines
the nature of the problem and chooses when to bring the case, which events
to allege, and what relief to pursue in an attempt to meet her particular
safety needs . . . . [O]rders may commonly include relief that prohibits the
respondent from abusing, threatening, harassing, and assaulting the peti-
tioner and her children and from destroying their property; prevents the
respondent from contacting or coming near the petitioner, children, and cer-
tain locations; requires the respondent to enter domestic violence, parenting,
drug, and/or alcohol counseling; awards temporary custody, visitation, and
property; orders the respondent to vacate a shared residence; and requires
the respondent to pay attorney’s fees . . . . The wide-ranging injunctive relief
available in civil protection orders is far more comprehensive than relief
offered through the criminal restraining orders, which solely order the re-
spondent not to come near, contact, assault, or threaten the victim. The civil
orders are also available more immediately through the ex parte emergency
order and the longer-term order that is entered within weeks. In civil liti-
gation, the petitioner can request to dismiss the case if she determines the
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the CPO an effective means of reducing the risk of physical violence,248
beyond no-contact, stay away and no-abuse provisions, in some juris-
dictions civil protection orders provide ancillary relief in the form of
temporary child custody, financial support, housing, personal prop-
erty, and removal of the perpetrator.249 In particular, one of the keys
to a holistic approach to combating intimate partner violence is the
inclusion of a financial focus to established efforts.250
All U.S. jurisdictions currently maintain a statutory remedy in
the form of a civil protection order (CPO) for individuals seeking pro-
tection from an intimate partner.251 The CPOs fall into three broad
categories with regard to the provision of financial support. In cate-
gory one, the statute contains no provision for financial support and
has no catch-all provision.252 In category two, the law provides no spe-
cific authority to order support but maintains a catch-all provision
which enables the court to provide any relief necessary to protect
civil protection order is not helpful to her, whether because it does not meet
her needs or because she anticipates that increased danger will result. Her
right to exercise autonomy takes precedent over any general public interest.
The civil remedy can be contrasted with the prosecutor’s office deciding
whether to bring charges and what to charge . . . most often without seeking
the abuse survivor’s input . . . . There are a multitude of reasons why a sur-
vivor may desire court protection but not wish to pursue criminal sanctions,
and protection orders offer the survivor a tailored order that holds the respon-
dent legally accountable with the threat of criminal sanctions for its violation.
Id.
248. Id. at 318–19. Stoever explains:
Researchers have found that when abused women seek help from the civil jus-
tice system by filing for a protection order, they experience “significantly lower
levels” of violence—including threats, physical abuse, stalking, employment-
related harassment, and other risk factors for femicide—regardless of the
outcome of the case. One study that measured the efficacy of protection orders
over an eighteen-month period found that when a woman applied and quali-
fied for a protection order, she experienced a “rapid and significant decline
in violence,” which was sustained through the duration of the study. Another
survey of protection order petitioners found that when women applied for
orders, 98 [percent] felt more in control of their lives, 89 [percent] felt more
in control of the relationship, and women generally reported that the act of
applying for the order improved their sense of well-being. In follow-up inter-
views, 80 [percent] of participants felt safer, 85 [percent] reported that their
lives had improved, and over 90 [percent] felt better about themselves.
Id.
249. Id. at 363–65.
250. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 33.
251. See Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) by State, A.B.A. COMM’N ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (June 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated
/domviol/pdfs/dv_cpo_chart.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter CPOs by State].
252. See Heather R. Parker, Access Denied: The Disconnect Between Statutory and
Actual Access to Child Support for Civil Protection Order Petitioners, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
271, 281 (2007) (stating that thirty-four states authorize spousal support, implying that
some of the remaining sixteen states do not).
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the victim and her children.253 In category three, the court is specifi-
cally authorized to order support as part of the CPO.254
Even jurisdictions that provide economic remedies, however,
rarely provide petitioners with the level of financial support or other
resources necessary to survive on their own.255 In fact, despite in-
tended differences, the civil protection process has proved to be
surprisingly similar to the prosecution of criminal cases in several
significant ways.256 First, the court’s primary focus continues to re-
main on the act or acts of abuse—what occurred.257 Second, hearing
time is predominantly spent on proving the allegations of abuse
(although the standard of proof is lower), and not on the relief
necessary to ensure the victim and her children are best protected
from future abuse.258 And third, the actual relief entered tends to be
no-contact and no abuse provisions (restrictions on the perpetrator),
and not support, housing, or other ancillary relief that goes to the
heart of recidivism.259 Because the court is largely focused on tradi-
tional criminal justice matters, less attention is paid to vital fea-
tures of the civil remedy—the provision of ancillary relief aimed at
eliminating the batterer’s power to control the victim beyond crimi-
nal acts of abuse.260 Accordingly, although the civil system has the
promise of affording greater protections, it fails to reach that poten-
tial in many cases due, in part, to either statutory limitations or to
its application by individual judges.
A. Defining Abuse & Protected Class Members
[T]he diffusion of images of women hurt by their
partners has unquestionably made the use of force
a litmus test . . . .261
Although legal scholars tend to define abuse broadly,262 courts
often focus on physical acts of violence and threats of harm as a
253. See Coker, supra note 123, at 187.
254. These three broad categories are discussed infra Part II.A.
255. See Coker, supra note 123, at 187.
256. Id. at 188.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 187.
259. Id. at 188.
260. Stoever, supra note 246, at 315.
261. See STARK, supra note 1, at 83.
262. See Pollet, supra note 188, at 40 (explaining that economic abuse includes any of
the following acts by the abuser: placing the property solely in his name; preventing the
other partner from working or going to school; exclusive financial control; stealing or
destroying the victim’s property; withholding information or access to finances; retal-
iatory termination of utilities or telephone; and failure to pay support).
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basis for the entry of a civil protection order. Although there is little
question that survivors of physical violence and threats of harm face
a variety of difficulties securing civil protection,263 women who ex-
perience intimate partner violence in the form of coercive control or
financial abuse are presented with distinct challenges.264 In fact,
many jurisdictions do not specify economic abuse as a statutorily
enumerated act of domestic violence.265 As a result, the acknowl-
edgement and identification of economic abuse or financial depra-
vation by individual judges is unpredictable. Moreover, given the
lack of attention paid to this type of intimate partner violence,
practicing attorneys may fail to recognize that the perpetrator’s acts
rise to the level of abuse given how a particular jurisdiction defines
domestic violence.
Civil protection order statutes in the vast majority of states
define domestic violence as an act, or a threat of, physical or sexual
harm.266 Jurisdictions that focus exclusively on individual acts of
physical abuse or a threat of physical harm deny victims of economic
abuse important protections.267 As a result, in these jurisdictions
would-be petitioners are not only precluded from seeking protection
from abuse, they are also denied the ancillary relief necessary to
break the cycle of abuse.
Arkansas, for example, defines domestic violence as “[p]hysical
harm, bodily injury . . . or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members”
or “[a]ny sexual conduct between family or household members . . .
that constitutes a crime . . . .”268 Similarly, Connecticut limits protected
class members to only those individuals who have experienced a threat
of “continuous physical pain” or injury.269
263. Our legal system’s expectation that petitioners who seek civil protection orders
will have readily available evidence of the abuse beyond their own testimony (such as
police reports, eyewitness, photographic evidence, prior convictions, 911 tapes, and hos-
pital reports) at the time of trial and possess the legal skill required to present the evi-
dence to the court belies the dynamics of intimate partner violence and the complexities
of our legal system. See Coker, supra note 123, at 187.
264. It is not this author’s intention to make comparisons between women who exper-
ience physical abuse and those who are victims of economic abuse. In fact, many battered
women experience a multitude of abusive acts (physical, sexual, emotional, and eco-
nomic) during the course of an abusive relationship. It is important, however, to under-
stand that intimate partner violence must be defined broadly to identify the greatest
number of protected class members.
265. CPOs by State, supra note 251.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (3)(A)-(B) ( West 2013).
269. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-15(a) (West 2013).
2014] FINANCIAL FREEDOM 373
By limiting the protected class to only those individuals who are
able to prove a threat of or actual physical harm, a large number of
individuals in abusive relationships are left unprotected. As a result,
victims of intimate partner violence who would otherwise be able to
prove “coercive control”270 or economic abuse are precluded from
seeking what they need the most—ancillary relief in the form of
financial support.
Although women who experience intimate partner violence may
suffer from physical abuse and economic control at the same time,
proving that either occurred presents a host of challenges.271 First,
not all acts of intimate partner violence are physical in nature.272
Second, even physical acts of violence do not always result in iden-
tifiable injuries.273 Third, in domestic violence cases in particular, it
is not uncommon—even when injuries do occur—that evidence is not
secured.274 As a result, it is often exceedingly difficult to prove acts
of intimate partner violence even when they are criminal in nature.
Because of the difficulties proving individual acts of intimate
partner violence, establishing a pattern of coercive control may be
the key to providing much needed protections to women in abusive
relationships. Yet, victims of coercive control are often barred from
providing evidence of economic abuse, as well as their need for pro-
tection from the harms that result from economic abuse due to statu-
tory language or interpretation.275
Our system’s narrow focus on acts that rise to the level of criminal
conduct neglects the historical intent and purpose of civil protection
generally. These civil laws were based on the idea that intimate part-
ner violence takes many forms.276 In addition, the civil protection
order was created to provide a survivor of domestic violence with an
alternative to the criminal justice system, to give her control over
the process, and to provide relief well beyond the limitations of our
criminal justice system.277
270. See STARK, supra note 1, at 15. Dr. Evan Stark defines “coercive control” as follows:
[C]oercive control entails a malevolent course of conduct that subordinates
women to an alien will by violating their physical integrity (domestic vio-
lence), denying them respect and autonomy (intimidation), depriving them
of social connectedness (isolation), and appropriating or denying them access
to the resources required for personhood and citizenship (control).
Id.
271. Stoever, supra note 246, at 303.
272. Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32.
273. STARK, supra note 1, at 94–95.
274. Id. at 95.
275. Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 2.
276. Id.
277. For details of the difference between civil protection and the criminal justice system,
see Stoever, supra note 246, at 320.
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As a result, a limited number of jurisdictions provide an expanded
definition of domestic violence.278 While not specifically listing finan-
cial control within the definition of abuse, some jurisdictions include
a catch-all provision beyond allegations of physical violence and
threats of harm which may rise to the level of abuse in accordance
with the intent and purpose of the civil protection act.279 Louisiana
is one such jurisdiction that maintains an expanded definition of
abuse,280 specifying that domestic violence includes “but is not lim-
ited to” criminal acts.
Some jurisdictions provide even greater clarity. For example,
Delaware includes “[a]ny other conduct which a reasonable person . . .
would find threatening or harmful,” as part of its definition of abuse.281
Although such nondescript provisions leave open the possibility of
protections for victims of economic abuse, these laws are open to
interpretation at the discretion of individual judges. As a result,
victims of economic abuse are left wondering what protections are
available to them. Moreover, depending on the views of individual
judges, survivors of economic abuse may be seen as less deserving
of protection than survivors of physical abuse, threats of harm, or
other conduct a reasonable person would find as harmful.
B. Financial Remedies
Poverty and battering are mutually reinforcing
traps . . . .282
Financial independence shifts power within the intimate rela-
tionship.283 The economics of intimate partner violence suggest that
financial independence provides a woman who is battered with the
freedom to control what is fundamental—food, clothing, and shelter.284
In addition, this freedom to control has large-scale implications—the
power to control one’s own actions, future, and fate.
Even if economic abuse is not the primary reason why a peti-
tioner seeks protection, it can become a successful tool for a perpe-
trator of intimate partner violence to regain power over a partner
who seeks to end the abusive relationship.285 As a result, for a woman
278. CPOs by State, supra note 251.
279. Id.
280. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(3) (2013).
281. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(1)(h).
282. See BRUSH, supra note 181, at 123.
283. Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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to remain free from abuse, protections must be put in place both to
secure her safety and to ensure her economic independence.
Civil protective orders are an effective way of taking immediate
action by removing an abuser from the home and thus ceasing (al-
though sometimes only temporarily) the violence. Removal of the
abuser from the home both interrupts the violence as well as pro-
vides a safe haven for women and their children. Ordering the abuser
to stay away from and to have no contact with his victim provides
additional protective measures. First, the survivor of domestic vio-
lence and her children are able to begin the healing process without
interference from the abuser.286 Second, the batterer, if receptive,
can begin the process of rehabilitation.
Financial support pursuant to a civil protection order is one of
the essential elements to ensure freedom from abuse. Economic
remedies may come in the form of child, spousal, or household
support, as well as interim alimony.287 The court may also have the
authority to order the abuser to pay the victim compensation for
losses suffered as a direct result of domestic violence, for counseling,
or for other medical costs.288
Rhode Island is an example of a jurisdiction that falls within
the first category—a state that neither specifically authorizes the
court to order support to the petitioner nor possesses a catch-all
provision that enables a petitioner to seek support pursuant to the
civil protection order.289 As a result, battered petitioners must seek
support by filing additional petitions with the court.290
Separate filings and hearings add an additional layer of diffi-
culty to a challenging legal and emotional battle that women who
are abused must wage when seeking protection from our courts. In
addition to the onerous civil protection proceeding, further hearings
must be scheduled on an emergency basis, if possible, to ensure that
286. When the batterer is permitted to have contact with his victim, he has the opportu-
nity to successfully convince her that she will not be able to survive without him. Batterers
may use both economic threats as well as threats of physical harm. Given the economic
vulnerability of the victim, the batterer can be very persuasive reentering her life.
287. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 912 (1993).
288. See Jerry J. Phillips, What’s a Good Woman Worth? Tort Compensation for Domestic
Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 303, 308–09 (2001).
289. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-8.1-3 (West 2013).
290. Although there is no indication in the statute that the court is authorized to order
temporary support, advocacy documents maintain that the Rhode Island courts may order
temporary child support pursuant to a restraining order for up to ninety days, upon notice
to the respondent and a hearing. See Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, WOMENSLAW
.ORG, http://www.womenslaw.org/laws_state_type.php?id=582&state_code=RI&open_id
=all#content-4222 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
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proper support is provided. The protective power of the domestic
violence civil order (i.e., restriction from acting in an abusive or ha-
rassing manner generally), is greatly diminished if the perpetrator
is able to control the victim through financial means.
Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin fall within a second cat-
egory of jurisdictions that do not specifically provide the court with
authority to order child, spousal, or household support pursuant to
the state’s domestic violence civil protection act,291 yet have what is
considered a “catch-all” provision authorizing the court to provide
any other relief that it deems just under the circumstances.
Arizona law, for example, does not specifically authorize the
court to provide for spousal or child support but maintains a catch-
all provision.292 Yet, Arizona’s Petition for Order of Protection pro-
vides no mechanism for a petitioner to make a request for spousal
or child support, nor does the court’s standard order for protection
provide for support pursuant to the catch-all provision.293 Jurisdic-
tions falling within this second category often lack clarity within the
language of the law which may lead to unpredictability with regard
to outcomes for victims seeking protection.
A third category is comprised of states that specifically autho-
rize the court to order support directly through the civil protection
process.294 Yet, even these jurisdictions place limits on the protected
class members eligible for financial relief.295 Vermont’s statute, for
example, specifically requires that the defendant have a duty to sup-
port the plaintiff or common child before the court will order a respon-
dent to pay living expenses or support pursuant to a civil protection
order.296 These laws provide no remedy for women who cohabitate
with their abusers, even though these women tend to be poorer on
average than married women.297
Legislators who empower the court to provide financial sup-
port pursuant to the civil protective order statute understand the
291. See CPOs by State, supra note 251 (providing a breakdown of the child and spousal
support provisions pursuant to the civil protection order act by state, in addition to other
information regarding said civil protection orders).
292. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(G)(6) (2013).
293. See PROTECTIVE ORDER FORMS, available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/33
/POforms.pdf.
294. See CPOs by State, supra note 251.
295. Id.
296. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(c)(2)(E)–(F) (West 2013). Delaware, Alabama, and
Alaska maintain a similar provision. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(d)(5) (2013); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.66.100(c)(12) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(6) (West 2013).
297. Jonathan Vespa & Matthew A. Painter II, The Path to Marriage: Cohabitation
and Wealth Accumulation (Sept. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State
University), available at http://paa2008.princeton.edu/papers/81019.
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connection between domestic violence and poverty. Delaware, similar
to Vermont, authorizes the court to provide support in the form of
spousal and child support, as well as compensation for losses suf-
fered as a direct result of domestic violence.298 Individual judges,
however, may fail to utilize the full force and effect of the law. The
problem is two-fold. First, the actual dollar amount of the support
ordered is important. If the support amount is not at a level that en-
ables that victim to meet her basic living expenses, she is at risk of
future violence given her abuser’s ability to maintain control over
her.299 Second, the dollar amount of support ordered by the court is
meaningless if our system fails to effectively enforce its orders.
C. Enforcement
[P]ut pressure on the law and, broadly conceived,
the politics of public institutional response . . .300
A civil protection order is simply a piece of paper—it is neither
a bullet proof vest guaranteeing physical protection nor an assur-
ance of ancillary relief. For the perpetrator who seeks to control his
victim subsequent to the entry of an order, refusal to pay support is
an effective means. A perpetrator who shuts off the heat, refuses to
pay the rent, or neglects to mail the support check has comparable
power to control as a batterer who threatens physical harm.
Admittedly, it is impossible to predict which abusers will take
retaliatory actions, whatever the form, subsequent to the entry of a
protection order. What we do know about perpetrators of intimate
partner violence is that they violate civil orders of protection reg-
ularly.301 Criminal violations such as physical acts of violence, threats
of harm, and no-contact violations are generally addressed through
the criminal justice system.302 Yet, enforcement of ancillary relief
pursuant to a civil protection order, such as support, is typically the
responsibility of the abused individual.303 And although a victim
has the right to contact law enforcement in response to an abuser’s
298. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (West 2013).
299. See Lowe & Prout, supra note 134, at 32–33.
300. Jane Maslow Cohen, Private Violence and Public Obligation: The Fulcrum of
Reason, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 356 (Martha Albertson Fineman
and Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
301. See David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1153 (1995).
302. See Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection Order Coverage:
A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 107 (2005).
303. Id.
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failure to comply with the support provisions of a civil order of pro-
tection, such contacts to law enforcement are rarely treated as a
high priority.304
The vast majority of individuals who have a civil protection order
must seek to enforce the support provisions of that order on their
own, with the assistance of a pro bono attorney or by hiring private
counsel.305 Given the inadequate finances of most survivors and the
limited resources of many legal aid agencies, pro bono organizations,
and law school clinics, many women represent themselves in their
quest to enforce court-ordered support provisions.306 The problems
associated with self-representation,307 however, are not the only diffi-
culties women face seeking to enforce a civil protection order.
A support provision pursuant to a civil protection order is only
as effective as an individual judge demands it to be. Batterers who
choose to disregard the support provisions of the civil order and are
merely reminded of their obligation to pay support at a court pro-
ceeding for contempt will have little incentive to comply with the
order in the future.
In some cases multiple motions for contempt must be filed over
an extended period of time, resulting in little more than the court
holding the respondent in contempt of the order and again mandat-
ing that the perpetrator do what is already required—comply with
the previously ordered support obligation.308 For an individual of
limited financial resources, the failure on the part of our legal sys-
tem to hold the batterer accountable over an extended period of time
may result in utility shut off, foreclosure, homelessness, an inability
304. Id. at 146.
305. Zlotnick, supra note 301, at 1170.
306. Id. at 1197.
307. Certainly self-representation is not preferable for a survivor of intimate partner
violence. Without a strong advocate, many survivors are no match for their abuser in a
court proceeding, an abuser who may seek to harass or intimidate the battered individual
through the court process.
308. For example, during the course of researching and writing this Article, the author
was acting as a mentor for a volunteer attorney who accepted his first family case with
a local pro bono agency. The pro bono attorney explained to the author that he was frus-
trated with the family court judge after he handled a contempt matter for a battered
woman seeking to enforce the support provision of her civil protection order. The pro
bono attorney expressed his surprise that the judge would find the abuser in contempt
for failure to comply with the support provision and yet simply order him to pay the
support he already owed without placing the abuser on work release or providing some
other guarantee of payment. This author was sorry to admit to the pro bono attorney that
the outcome was standard practice, and not an exception to the rule, in these cases. Al-
though other options were explored, regrettably his client (a mother of two who speaks
no English) is considering returning to her abusive spouse in order to feed her children
and avoid eviction from her apartment. This is clearly the outcome her abusive partner
has been hoping for all along, given his inquiries to counsel regarding reconciliation.
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of the victim to feed herself and her children, family services investi-
gations, credit problems, and bankruptcy.
Ultimately the abuser and his victim learn valuable lessons:
(1) there are few consequences to those who fail to comply with the
court’s order; (2) filing for contempt in the future will be futile; and
(3) the legal system places little value on its own orders.
One way to monitor the respondent’s compliance with the pro-
visions of the civil order and to take the responsibility out of hands
of the victim is to institute a court monitoring program. The court
can schedule compliance hearings within 30 to 60 days of the entry
of the civil order to confirm that the batterer is meeting his obliga-
tions pursuant to the civil order. Under this system, the court holds
the batterer accountable, takes the burden off the petitioner, safe-
guards necessary resources, and reduces the risk of future harm.
Regrettably, judges often have limited power when a batterer
fails to pay support pursuant to a civil order of protection. If the
abuser is held in contempt, the judge can order fines, incarceration,
civil contempt, or work release. Ordering the respondent to pay ad-
ditional fines for his failure to pay support is unlikely to result in
the batterer’s compliance with his original support obligation. Incar-
ceration also fails to provide a viable option, as it may place the bat-
terer’s employment in jeopardy while doing little to ensure the victim
receives support. On the other hand, holding the batterer in civil
contempt in lockup until he pays back support may be an effective
incentive for some abusers. Finally, work release may be the best
possible alternative to traditional incarceration as it will ensure
payment as well as allow the batterer to continue to work.
IV. ON THE ROAD TO FINANCIAL SECURITY:
AREAS OF CONCENTRATION
[T]he remedies for battering and poverty need to
focus on the same systemic phenomena that cause
them. Thus, feminists call for structural changes
in class, race, and gender relations; safety, justice,
and human rights for those historically exploited
and violated; and accountability, redistribution,
and reorganization of resources and power . . . .309
Financial freedom is one of the critical keys to ending violence
in the lives of battered women and their children.310 Ensuring the
309. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 32.
310. Coker, supra note 123, at 188.
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economic stability and, in turn, the protection of abused individuals
is complex—there is no simple answer to the problem.311 Instead,
the safety of women and children can only be achieved through a
multifaceted approach to financial security involving a variety of
programs and participants. The following three principal solutions
are considered within this section: (A) battered mandated support;
(B) wage and labor parity; and (C) social welfare.
A. Batterer Mandated Support
[B]attering “takes two”: an abusive man and a
system of inequality and disadvantage that rein-
forces a woman’s vulnerability and limits her op-
tions for resistance and escape once he has “reeled
her in.” 312
A reasonable initial response to the economic instability of
women who are abused is the court-ordered support pursuant to a
civil protection order, which is often the first stage of protection for
the battered individual. Support pursuant to a civil protection order
may take several forms. Temporary child support, for example, may
be ordered if the parties have a child or children in common.313 The
entry of a temporary child support order, however, may result in un-
intended negative consequences for victims. If the court enters a
minimum child support order due to lack of evidence of the batterer’s
income, which often occurs given the expedited nature of these hear-
ings, the victim may be barred from obtaining an emergency child
support hearing following the entry of the CPO.
The civil protection hearing is not necessarily the ideal forum
for addressing financial support. First, batterers are typically not
required to bring documentation of income to a civil protection hear-
ing. This presents challenges because petitioners are often unable
to produce the financial documentation necessary to establish the
batterer’s income given the victim’s lack of access to her abuser’s
financial information, as well as her limited ability to secure docu-
mentation through discovery prior to trial.
311. Identifying the ideal solution is multilayered necessitating a combination of batterer
mandated support, public assistance, and private funding. This Article considers a solution-
based approach focused primarily on battered mandated support mindful that other solu-
tions such as private funding and public assistance are necessary to ensure the financial
freedom of battered women.
312. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 31–32.
313. Klein & Orloff, supra note 287, at 890–91.
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Second, the civil protective process is simply not designed to
assess the financial needs of the petitioner or the income of the par-
ties. These cases are often resolved without a true child support cal-
culation. Moreover, the primary focus of the proceeding is abuse
determination (adjudication), not restoration of the victim. As a
result, these orders often fail to capture the actual level of support
necessary to keep the victim and her children safe.
This problem arises at all stages of the case: pretrial, during
negotiations, and at trial. At the pretrial stage the attorney, if one
is involved, often focuses primarily on proving acts of abuse, as an
act must be established for the court to enter an order.314 Unless the
petitioner is able to prove the batterer’s behavior falls within the
definition of abuse as defined by state law, the court will not have
jurisdiction to order ancillary relief. Thus, unless the parties enter
into a consent agreement, if an act of abuse or a course of conduct
is not proved at the time of trial, the matter is dismissed. As a result,
some lawyers may dedicate little time and attention to ancillary relief
in the form of support, knowing that they must prove abuse first.
Lawyers who do not spend time and attention on spousal or child
support matters pretrial fail to meet their duty of competence as
required by the rules of professional conduct.315
The negotiation stage may be another missed opportunity for
petitioner or her counsel. If counsel is inadequately prepared to ne-
gotiate issues of support or lacks proper financial documentation,
counsel will have little leverage to obtain a sufficient support agree-
ment. In litigated cases, the vast majority of hearing time is spent
proving acts of abuse. Further, judicial deliberation is often focused
on whether those acts rise to the level of abuse as defined by law
leaving insufficient hearing time for matters of ancillary relief. In
addition, an attorney may be hesitant to request support during
opening statements or early in the trial because it may appear that
the petitioner’s sole motivation for seeking a CPO is support, not
protection. An opposing attorney or party who is able to persuade
the trial judge of fraudulent intent may be successful in having the
case dismissed, in particular, when there is little evidence of abuse.
Accordingly, the current CPO process results in the entry of lower
support amounts for a longer period of time than the filing of a sep-
arate petition for child support. By providing this much needed—yet
insufficient—temporary child support through the CPO, financial
314. Competent representation requires preparation for proof of abuse and relief. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.1 cmt. (1983).
315. Id. at R. 1.1.
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security—one of the intended protective outcomes of the CPO
process—does not ensue.
The entry of a spousal support award pursuant to a civil pro-
tection order presents many of the same challenges as the entry of
a child support award at the time of the CPO hearing. In addition,
victims who are not married to their abuser are typically unable to
seek such relief. The provision of household support may be a viable
alternative in cases where an abuser has no other legal obligation
to support the petitioner. Courts, however, are less likely to enter
support orders pursuant to a civil protection order, or they other-
wise require a perpetrator to provide for a petitioner he would
otherwise have no other legal obligation to support—by way of mar-
riage or a child in common—even if a civil protection act provides
relief in the form of household support.
The direct payment of household expenses (such as rent and
utilities) is another remedy to ensure the safety and protection of
the victim. The direct payment of household expenses is also often
linked to a duty to support, triggering many of the problems pre-
viously considered. Yet, direct payment orders present additional
challenges, placing even greater control in the hands of the batterer.
These orders make it difficult for a petitioner to monitor payments,
particularly when the property, lease, or utilities are solely in the
name of the perpetrator. As a result, control is placed in the hands
of the party who has a history of abusing his power and authority.
In addition, jurisdictions that provide ancillary relief in the
form of support often do so for a limited period of time. For example,
a number of jurisdictions provide support pursuant to a CPO for one
year only,316 even when the no-contact provision can be entered for
an extended period of time. Once the year is up, support provided
pursuant to the protective order expires. Thus, unless the battered
person files a petition for support and receives an order prior to the
expiration of the ancillary support provision, she will be financially
unprotected should her batterer decide to stop paying support. Such
an outcome is highly likely once the support order has expired.
Yet a petitioner who obtains temporary support as part of their
protective order will be unable to establish that immediate and ir-
reparable harm will result should she not be afforded an expedited
hearing, given the existence of the temporary support award pur-
suant to the protective order. As a result, the petitioner may wait
months for a full hearing on support. In the meantime, the batterer
will be empowered while the victim suffers the financial repercussions
316. CPOs by State, supra note 251.
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from this flawed legal system. An automatic fast track or expedited
hearing for all child and spousal support ancillary matters upon the
entry of a civil protection order could ensure the financial freedom
survivors need to remain free from violence.317
Requiring batterers to provide documentation of income at the
time of the CPO hearing, eliminating direct pay orders, court moni-
toring, criminal enforcement of violations of CPO support provisions,
and expediting support hearings post CPO hearing are just some of
the alternatives available to encourage independence and to ensure
the safety of victims of domestic violence and their children.318
Because this problem is multilayered, various public and pri-
vate remedies must also be considered to ensure that women who
are abused are able to remain free from their abusive partners.319
B. Wage & Labor Parity
Women are half the world’s population, yet they do
two-thirds of the world’s work, earn one-tenth of
the world’s income, and own less than one per cent
of the world’s property. They are among the poorest
of the world’s poor.320
Today women working substantially the same jobs as their male
counterparts earn less.321 According to a study by the Institute for
Women’s Policy Research, in 2009 “the median weekly earnings of
full-time, female workers were 80.2 [percent] of what full-time male
317. Once a battered woman is granted a hearing for support, it is likely that she will
have a difficult time obtaining the services of an attorney. Although some battered
women find it difficult to obtain legal representation for their CPO hearing, greater
resources are available for legal services for individuals seeking protection orders than
for other legal representation.
318. There are many issues post-protective order which must be addressed as well,
such as long-term child and spousal awards, divorce and property division, as well as
alimony awards, to ensure survivor independence and safety.
319. For alternative measures, see Cole & Buel, supra note 245, at 1 (calling for welfare
reform); Shelby A.D. Moore, Understanding the Connection between Domestic Violence,
Crime, and Poverty: How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women from Leaving Abusive
Relationships, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 451, 457 (2003); Jennifer Sarkees, Phase Three of
New York State’s Domestic Violence Law: The Financial Aftermath, 14 BUFF. WOMEN’S
L.J. 95, 96 (2006) (identifying welfare reform, equitable distribution, intestacy rights,
and bankruptcy as key areas to consider).
320. GLOBAL FOOTPRINTS, HEC GLOBAL LEARNING, GENDER FOOTPRINT, available at
http://www.globalfootprints.org/women (quoting Barber B. Conable, Jr., former president
of the World Bank).
321. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 2.
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workers earned.”322 In fact, the study revealed that, on average,
women earn less than their male counterparts in the vast majority
of occupations.323 Likewise, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports
that on average a female earns $684 a week, while a male’s median
weekly earnings is $832.324 As a result, working women on average
earn $7,696 less each year than working men. Considering these fig-
ures, over the course of a lifetime women could experience approxi-
mately $307,840 in lost wages.325 Moreover, the lost income figure
fails to take into consideration breaks in employment due to the
birth of a child, which are primarily borne by females. In fact, only
56.4 percent of women with infants under a year old participated in
the labor force in 2008.326 And although women tend to return to the
labor force as their children grow older,327 even temporary depar-
tures from the workforce with each new child are devastating to both
female earnings and to opportunities for advancement.
If lapses in employment typical of the female labor experience
are added to the equation, the total disparity in earning capacity
between men and women is much greater. Although more and more
families consist of two working parents (58.5 percent),328 married
women continue to be more likely than married men to leave the
labor force to take care of the children. According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, “the share of married-couple families where the
father was employed (and the mother was not) was 30.4 percent; the
322. Id. These figures fail to take into consideration race and gender. Curiously, at
first glance white women appear to suffer greater income disparity than do black and
Hispanic women. African American women earned ninety-one percent of black males and
Hispanic women earned eighty-eight percent of the earnings of Hispanic men. See
Women at Work, supra note 99. These divergent male to female ratios for minority
workers may be due in large part to the lower earnings of black and Hispanic males as
compared to white males.
323. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 2 (“Full-time, employed women on average
earned less than their male counterparts in 104 of 108 occupations for which the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides earning data for both male and female workers.”).
324. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. Dept. Of Labor, WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE: A DATABOOK (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf.
325. This monetary figure is based on a calculation of $7,696 x 40 years of employment
without any interruption. Interruptions in the lifetime employment of a worker, typical
for child-bearing women, would equate to greater wage disparity for women.
326. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Participation of Mothers with
Infants in 2008 (Sept. 2009), http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm.
327. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the rate of labor force participation
of mothers with children between 6 and 17 years old are higher than those with children
under age 6. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Participation Rates of
Mothers, 1975–2008 (Jan. 2009), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100507.htm.
328. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Employment Status of Parents, 2011 (Apr.
2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120427.htm.
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share where the mother was employed (and the father was not) was
6.9 percent.”329
Compounding the problem, women are twice as likely to hold
part-time jobs.330 In fact, in 2002 approximately twenty-five percent
of women in the labor force held part-time positions, whereas only
eleven percent of men were employed in part-time jobs during the
same time period.331 These reduced hour jobs come at a price: fewer
dollars and reduced benefits for the female part-time worker and
her children.
Unexpectedly, wage disparity between male and female earn-
ings increases in occupations with higher earning potential.332 For
example, a recent survey indicated that the ratio of female to male
earnings for personal financial advisors was 58.4 percent, female to
male insurance agents was 66.7 percent, female to male lawyers
was 77.1 percent, and female to male postsecondary teachers was
77.3 percent.333
Not only do women tend to earn less than men when they work
in the same occupations, but it is also evident that there continues
to be significant gender segregation among occupations, with many
women working in female-dominated lower paying occupations.334
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2011 women consti-
tuted 81.7 percent of all elementary and middle school teachers; 81.6
percent of all social workers; 74.9 percent of all tailors, dressmakers,
and sewers; and 64.4 percent of all hotel, motel and resort desk
clerks.335 In contrast, women accounted for only 13.6 percent of all
architects and engineers; 24.2 percent of all chief executives; 31.9
percent of all lawyers; 33.8 percent of all physicians and surgeons;
and 34.1 percent of all news analysts, reporters, and correspondents.336
Curiously, in order to earn a living wage, a woman must employ
greater economic resources for higher education than a male worker.337
For example, a woman seeking a high-median pay job in a female-
dominated occupation, such as paralegal ($846 per week), must
329. Id.
330. Women at Work, supra note 99, at 47.
331. Id. at 47.
332. See Women at Work, supra note 99.
333. See id.
334. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 2; see also Women at Work, supra note 99,
at 48. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2002, women were “underrepre-
sented in many specific professions and overrepresented in others. For example, they
comprise just 11 percent of engineers but 93 percent of registered nurses.” Id.
335. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Women as a Percent of Total Employed in Se-
lected Occupations, 2011 (May 2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120501.htm.
336. Id.
337. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 12.
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pursue advanced education, while a male-dominated occupation of
a similar pay grade, such as electrician ($856 per week), requires no
advanced education.338
Education, however, does provide some protection for women.339
As a result, the greatest challenges lie with women who lack skills
or education, while struggling to end a violent relationship. These
workers, often employed in female-dominated low-skilled jobs, are
more likely to fall at or near the poverty level.340 Alternatively, indi-
viduals working in male-dominated low-skilled jobs are more likely
to be able to support a family.341 These findings indicate that women
lacking education and employment skills—characteristics of women
in violent relationships—will struggle financially to make ends meet
once they separate from their abuser. In fact, experts maintain that
abused women on welfare make substantially less per hour (seventy-
six cents less per hour) than women on welfare who are not abused,342
placing survivors of domestic violence at the lowest levels of our
poor. The resulting poverty leaves them with few options.
The diminished earning capacity of employed females, however,
is one of many struggles they encounter. Working women face many
pressures: career-mom, caregiver, cook, and housekeeper. With these
multiple pressures comes increased stress, which in turn results in
poor health outcomes. As a result, overburdened working mothers
may suffer physically and emotionally. For women exiting abusive
relationships, these emotional and physical stresses are magnified
338. Id.
339. RANDY ALBELDA & CHRIS TILLY, GLASS CEILINGS AND BOTTOMLESS PITS: WOMEN’S
WORK, WOMEN’S POVERTY 26 (1997) (maintaining that “for women, education is particu-
larly important in staving off poverty”).
340. See supra Part III.A; see also Richard Tolman & Jody Raphael, A Review of
Research on Welfare and Domestic Violence, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 655 (2000).
341. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 13.
342. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 56–57. Brush explains:
In terms of economic costs, mean wages for women in this study who re-
ported physical violence were 76 cents per hour less than mean wages for
respondents who did not report physical abuse. Similarly, the women who
had ever filed a restraining order against an intimate partner (including one
woman who filed during the follow-up period) averaged a 53-cent-per-hour
decrease in their hourly wages over a follow-up period. The women who had
not filed a restraining order averaged an increase in their hourly wages of
approximately the same amount. At first blush, 76 cents per hour may not
seem like a big wage gap between welfare recipients who do and welfare
recipients who do not report having been physically abused. However, it is
nearly 15 percent of minimum wage at the time when we conducted these
interviews. In many of the low-wage occupations in the U.S. economy, the
wage gap between women and men is less than 15 percent, and feminists
still think of it as a significant material as well as a symbolic problem.
Id.
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by the effects of intimate partner violence, which in turn place them
at an increased risk for mental and physical health problems.343
In contrast, much of the old-world view that a woman can sur-
vive and even thrive by finding a man to support her continues to
some extent.344 Although young women today are encouraged to at-
tend college or seek employment, through socialization, some young
women continue to grow up believing that the men in their lives will
support them financially.345 Moreover, some men continue to prefer
women who are willing to play a supportive role.346 In fact, research
suggests that “socialization in relation to gender norms continues to
influence” the employment decisions of men and women today.347
This practice is both risky and dangerous, as it leaves women vul-
nerable to abuse and exploitation.
Socialization is one of several factors that influence the entrap-
ment of women. A female child raised to believe that a future hus-
band will support her may forgo educational opportunities or job skills
that would otherwise give her the power to control her future, which
is critical should she need to break free from an abuser’s control.348
The entrapment is made certain by the batterer’s ability to render
his victim totally dependent upon him financially.349 Further, male
children socialized to believe that the man is the expected bread-
winner may later discourage their female intimates from entering
343. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, http://
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2014).
344. KERSTIN AUMANN ET AL., THE NEW MALE MYSTIQUE, FAMILIES AND WORK INST.
8 (2011).
345. See GALLEN, supra note 226, at 84 (“Ancient blueprints, which they thought had
eschewed, come rushing in unbidden. All of a sudden, that old, dismissed idea that their
husbands should take care of them becomes hard to shake . . . Now what?”). This practice
is problematic for males as well, creating unfair expectations that they must shoulder
the responsibility of supporting the family. In addition, young boys, solely because they
are born male, may experience undue stress believing they must succeed financially in
order to attract a mate. Certainly free choice between partners, based on planning and
not gender, may result in one individual remaining outside the labor force to care for the
children. Such a result may work best for a particular family and can be equitable,
provided the decision is not based on gender alone. Certainly such evenhanded decision-
making can be found in our society. Same-sex partnerships provide a good example of
gender-blind family management. A couple may determine that it is best for the family
unit to have one parent remain home to care for the children, choosing the caretaker
based on a number of factors unrelated to gender, such as job-flexibility, earning capac-
ity, household budget, a willingness or desire to remain outside the labor force, bonding,
parenting skills, and related issues.
346. AUMANN ET AL., supra note 344, at 8.
347. HEGEWISCH ET. AL., supra note 102, at 1.
348. H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN
FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 25 (2003).
349. Id.
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the paid labor force, or deny other women access to employment oppor-
tunities over male applicants.350 Together socialization and economic
entrapment play a role in reducing the likelihood that a female victim
will be successful in freeing herself from an abusive relationship.351
C. Social Welfare
If work were the universal solution to the problems
of battering and poverty, surely those problems
would be solved by now.352
When it comes to poverty, gender matters. In fact, research sug-
gests that “the most common face of poverty in the United States
among adults is a woman’s.”353 Yet gender, coupled with other key
factors, increases “the probability of being poor.”354 Race, marital
status, education, and whether a single woman has children are
some of the relevant aspects to consider.355
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, households headed by fe-
males were more likely to be in poverty than households headed by
married couples or solely by males.356 In fact, over 50 percent of female
headed households experience episodic poverty.357 Moreover, chronic
poverty rates for these households were higher than for all other fam-
ily types.358 Specifically, female-headed households had a chronic pov-
erty rate of 9.7 percent, male-headed households experienced slightly
more than two percent, and married-couple families experienced a
chronic poverty rate of 0.7 percent.359 Not surprisingly, female-headed
households also remained in poverty for longer periods of time when
compared with any other family type.360 And as we have seen, women
who experience abuse are among the poorest of the poor.361
350. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 47 (examining the “ideology of male breadwinning”).
351. BRAGG, supra note 348, at 18.
352. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 12.
353. ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 339, at 23.
354. Id. at 24 (“[N]o matter how you look at the population, women are more likely than
men to be poor. But it’s not just gender that matters. Race, ethnicity, education, age, and
family type all greatly affect the probability of being poor as well.”).
355. Id. at 24 (referring to economist Nancy Folbre maintaining that “the highest risk
of poverty comes from being female and having children—which helps explain the high
rates of both female and child poverty in the United States”).
356. See ROBIN J. ANDERSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING: POVERTY, 2004–2006 (2011).
357. Id. at 7.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 11–12.
361. See supra Part IV.B.
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The current economic crisis in the United States has acted as
an aggravator, magnifying the negative financial implications for
society as a whole and women in particular.362 Since the recession,
household income has declined.363 Not surprisingly, the number of
people experiencing poverty has been increasing at a significant rate
since 2006.364 According to a report by the U.S. Census Bureau, people
living in poverty went from 43.6 million individuals in 2009 to 46.2
million individuals in 2010.365
Females and children suffer the most, with the recession serv-
ing to increase the divide between male and female poverty house-
holds.366 For example, female-only headed households experience
poverty at greater rates than male-only headed households (4.7 mil-
lion female-headed households as compared to 880,000 male-headed
households).367 There was little change in the number of male only
households in poverty from 2009 to 2010, compared with an addi-
tional 300,000 female only households entering poverty in 2010.368
Just as gender and poverty intersect, so do poverty and domes-
tic violence. Research suggests that more than half of women receiv-
ing public benefits have been abused by an intimate partner at some
point during adult life.369 In fact, some studies indicate that the
figure could be as high as eighty percent.370 The Bureau of Justice
Statistics reports that from 2001 to 2005, women “living in house-
holds with lower annual incomes experienced the highest average
annual rates” of nonfatal intimate partner victimization, and women
with incomes of less than $7,500 experienced the highest levels of
domestic violence.371
Housing stability is also related to both intimate partner vio-
lence and poverty. It is generally accepted among experts that one
362. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., POVERTY AMONG WOMEN AND FAMILIES, 2000–2009:
GREAT RECESSION BRINGS HIGHEST RATE IN 15 YEARS 1 (2010).
363. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 5 (2011) (“Since 2007,
the year before the most recent recession, real median household income has declined
6.4 percent”).
364. Id. at 14.
365. Id.
366. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 362, at 3.
367. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 363, at 18.
368. Id.
369. See Tolman & Raphael, supra note 340, at 655. See also Lowe & Prout, supra
note 134, at 33 (maintaining that “nearly all states report 50–60 percent of public wel-
fare recipients have experienced domestic violence”).
370. See Joan Meisel, et al., Domestic Violence Prevalence and Effects on Employment
in Two California TANF Populations, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1191, 1198 (2003).
371. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 6 (2007) available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/intimate
/victims.cfm [hereinafter VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS.].
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of the greatest causes of homelessness among women and children
is domestic violence.372 Not only do women who are abused require
short-term shelter services to aid them to safely extract themselves
and their children from violent homes, but also economic instability
resulting from the violent relationship often creates long-term hous-
ing instability.373 Female victims often lack title to real property,
face difficult court battles to seek property rights, turn to shelter
services, and struggle to meet the obligations that come with rental
housing alternatives.374
In fact, statistical information related to renting and battering
suggests that women who rent are victimized by intimates more
than three times the rate of women residing in owned housing.375
The high occurrence of intimate partner violence among women who
rent is a multifaceted problem. Females who rent, compared with
those in owned housing, are more likely to be separated from their
abusive partners.376 These same women are also likely to see their
household incomes significantly decrease at the time of separation,
as they no longer have access to their batterer’s salary, property, or
resources. Studies also indicate that separated women experience
higher rates of intimate partner violence than women of other
marital classes.377 These separated women, who tend to be abused
at higher rates, are also more likely to enter the poverty level at the
time of their separation.378 Thus, women who take protective mea-
sures, such as separation, as a result of domestic violence are likely
to experience both poverty and intimate partner violence at higher
rates; domestic violence acting as the catalyst for both their poverty
and their increased risk of violence.
Given the foregoing statistics, the mistaken conclusion could be
drawn that intimate partner violence is primarily a problem that
affects the poor. Yet, the relationship between domestic violence and
poverty is complex. Domestic violence scholars tend to agree that
intimate partner violence is blind to socioeconomic status, maintain-
ing that whether an individual will be abused is more closely linked
to the victim’s gender than any other factor.379
372. See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY, supra note 210, at 64.
373. Pavao et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Housing Instability, 32 AM. J.




377. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 371, at 3.
378. Id.
379. Research supports the proposition that gender is a good predictor of whether an
individual will be victimized by an intimate. According to a 2007 report by the Bureau
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Accordingly, there is much to suggest that poverty is not the
cause of intimate partner violence nor does its presence alone indi-
cate that intimate partner violence is to be expected in a particular
relationship.380 Instead, it is the batterer’s ability to restrict his vic-
tim’s access to financial and social capital that places her at a greater
risk of experiencing poverty at the time of separation.381 Furthermore,
the resulting homelessness, hunger, and extreme financial hardship
associated with poverty make it difficult for a survivor of domestic
violence to refuse her batterer’s attempts at reconciliation.382
Women who are abused are at an increased risk of poverty at the
time of separation for a variety of reasons.383 Women generally, as
we have seen, are more vulnerable to male exploitation given their
labor force experience.384 Women face gender discrimination, job sex-
typing, and wage gaps within the labor force; abused women in par-
ticular experience employment-related problems created by their
batterers.385 For example, batterers place restrictions on the employ-
ment or employability of their victims, wage a campaign to destroy
existing employment opportunities, or use finances to abuse and con-
trol their victims.386
It may seem logical to conclude that entry into the paid labor
force will provide much needed protections for women who are bat-
tered. However, employment alone does not necessarily resolve the
poverty or safety concerns abused women face.387 In fact, there is data
that suggests that poverty and labor force participation may actually
increase the risk of intimate partner homicide among women.388 Race
acts as an added risk factor.389 Researchers in one study found that
of Justice Statistics, females were more likely than males to experience nonfatal inti-
mate partner violence. See id. at 1.
380. Rachel Jewkes, Intimate Partner Violence: Causes and Prevention, 359 THE LANCET
1423, 1424 (2002).
381. JILL DAVIES, POLICY BLUEPRINT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND POVERTY, NAT’L
RESOURCE CENTER ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 6 (2002).
382. Id. at 5.
383. Id. at 6.
384. Id. at 5.
385. See supra Part II.B.
386. See supra Part IV.
387. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 23 (stating that the data she examined “calls into ques-
tion the notion that waged work is always every woman’s best route to safety and solvency.
In addition, not all abuse has the same implications for a woman’s employment, earnings,
and welfare eligibility”).
388. Edem F. Avakame, Sex Ratios, Female Labor Force Participation, and Lethal
Violence Against Women: Extending Guttentag and Secord’s Thesis, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1321, 1327 (1999), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com (explaining that research-
ers have found that “the female labor force participation rate increases the frequency of
homicide victimization for women”).
389. Id. at 1330.
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“[w]hite women are more likely than African American and other
minority women to be killed as a result of poverty and female labor
force participation.”390 The connection between employment, danger-
ousness, and race is multifaceted. The history of white women’s
participation in the labor force, coupled with the controlling char-
acteristics of a batterer, as well as various demographics, may help
to explain this phenomenon.
Experts tend to agree that perpetrators of intimate partner
violence seek to control their victims.391 Social pressures men experi-
ence related to their expected role as breadwinner may also act as
an aggravating factor. In addition, white women in abusive relation-
ships tend to be closely tied to their perpetrators because they are
more likely to be married than non-white women.392 Moreover, mar-
ried mothers tend to have lower employment participation rates
than unmarried women.393 As a result, white victims of intimate part-
ner violence will not only be married to their abusers at greater rates
than non-white victims, but—as a result of their marital status—
will also remain outside the labor force in greater numbers. Because
they do not have paid jobs, these white victims will also need to seek
employment in response to the abuse in greater numbers than vic-
tims of other races. If the victim’s help-seeking efforts in the form
of labor force entry are seen as a threat to the perpetrator’s power
to control, she will be at an increased risk of harm due directly to
her new employment.394 Although this is true for all races, because
minority women tend to be employed at higher rates generally, the
number of victims at risk of “labor force entry retaliation” may in
fact be higher for white battered women.395
390. Id. at 1332.
391. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 5 (2002)
(explaining that the “overarching behavioral characteristic of the batterer is the impo-
sition of control over his partner”).
392. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Household Economic Studies, Number, Timing and
Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2009, at 2–3 (May 2011), available at http://www
.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf (explaining that race and ethnicity effect marriage,
“with a higher percentage of Black women than non-Hispanic White women never mar-
ried in each age group . . . . For example, 71 percent of Black women aged 25 to 29 had
never married, compared with 43 percent of non-Hispanic White women in 2009”).
393. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Participation Rates Among Mothers
(May 2010) http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100507.htm (explaining that “unmarried
mothers have higher participation rates than married mothers. In 2008, 76 percent of un-
married mothers were in the labor force, compared with 69 percent of married mothers”).
394. See NEIL WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 20–21 (1999) (explain-
ing that research supports a positive correlation between separation from an intimate
relationship and “an increased risk of lethal violence” for the female partner); Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1991) (explaining the increased risks of violence after separation).
395. Avakame, supra note 388, at 1338.
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The foregoing data in no way suggest that non-white women are
not at risk of harm due to intimate partner violence. Battered women
of all races and cultures experience hardships due, in large part, to
gender, race, and culture.396 Women of color have suffered years of
gender and race bias, placing them at an extreme economic disad-
vantage today.397
Yet, the labor force entry retaliation data should not be ignored.
This data suggests that intimate partner violence triggers must be
considered when evaluating the soundest way to ensure the safety
of battered women and their children. If the financial stability of
battered women reduces the risk of recidivism by ending the hold
batterers have on their victims, finding the safest way to help women
who are abused achieve economic stability may be the key to ending
the cycle of violence.
The special relationship between a woman and her abusive
partner places her at an increased risk of harm. Unlike other crimes,
a victim of intimate partner violence is tied to and dependent on the
individual who commits the crime against her. Moreover, the batterer
has easy access to and information about her help-seeking efforts,
which is not typical of other crime victim and perpetrator associa-
tions. As a result, it is particularly difficult for a victim of intimate
partner violence to put in place measures to ensure her safety and
economic security prior to ending the abusive relationship.
Today, poverty acts as a barrier to exiting an abusive relation-
ship for many women regardless of marital or employment status.398
Given the current economic crisis, women face greater difficulties
given the larger number of individuals overall in need, as well as
the lack of available resources.399 Census figures for 2011 are cause
for concern; the data suggests that the poverty rate may be hitting
levels not seen since the 1960s.400
A survivor who works faces financial challenges depending on the
nature of her employment, the control her abuser has over the family
finances, the extent to which the perpetrator exerts economic abuse,
as well as the batterer’s inclination to violate a court order. Combined
with the problems women generally face related to work for pay, do-
mestic violence-specific employment aggravators are devastating.
396. Id. at 1321.
397. See, e.g., Cole & Buel, supra note 245, at 314.
398. Nancy Salamone, Domestic Violence and Financial Dependency, FORBES (Sept. 2,
2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/09/02/women-money-domestic-violence-forbes
-woman-net-worth-personal-finance.html.
399. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 362, at 1.
400. Hope Yen, U.S. Poverty on Track to Rise to Highest Since 1960s, ASSOC. PRESS
(July 22, 2012) (explaining that “poverty is spreading at record levels across many
groups”).
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In an ideal world, women would have equal opportunity in the
labor market and perpetrators of intimate partner violence would
comply with court-ordered support. As we know, however, the entry
of a support order does not guarantee payment and may in fact place
a woman who has been abused at greater risk of harm. Some of the
greatest challenges arise in high-risk cases, yet risk and lethality
assessments present a host of challenges.401 By mandating batterer
support, the victim is tied once again to her abuser, potentially
placing her at greater risk for violence.402 Moreover, such support
orders may inflame that batterer and provoke a dangerous response.
The reality that managing the family and home is not compen-
sated has placed women at a disadvantage in our society, a society
in which money is essential for survival. Although money has long
been important for wealth building, there was a time in history
when one could survive on individual production, barter, and social
capital.403 Today, however, money is essential for survival in most
cultures and communities. Thus, a woman who does not work for pay
is truly dependent on the breadwinner in her life. There are many
challenges that result when a society is highly financially oriented.
For example, although working exclusively in the labor force for pay
has become an alternative for some women, not only do they ex-
perience labor force disadvantages, it is an option that has signifi-
cant implications for individual families.404
401. See Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of
Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (2010) (examining the
benefits and disadvantages of lethality assessment).
402. Comments by Professor Judy Ritter, Faculty Workshop: Works in Progress held
at Widener University School of Law (Feb. 21, 2013).
403. See DEBORAH L. PRICE, MONEY MAGIC 19–20 (2003). Price explains:
From the beginning of recorded history, human beings exchanged goods and
services as a means of survival . . . .This barter of one thing for another,
however, had a very different energy from the exchange of money for goods.
Early commerce created community out of necessity. People had little choice
but to become interdependent, relying on one another for basic needs and
survival. Money altered this reality and changed human experience in ways
that were inconceivable before its invention. As people began to rely on one
another less and less, the experience of community diminished—although
we still long for it. Once money was in widespread use, the needs and desires
of human beings changed dramatically, and they have grown more complex
and challenging ever since.
Id.
404. Clearly, working mothers make an important contribution to the family economy,
serve as positive role models, and pose no danger to childhood development. For some fam-
ilies, however, the inflexibility and stress that comes from the employment of both parents
may be less conducive to their particular family structure. The choice is as individual as
each and every family. Yet in our economic society, women who remain outside the paid
labor force, a decision which is either made jointly with or solely by the men in their lives,
may be seriously disadvantaged if the relationship subsequently ends.
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Economic stability may be achieved in three primary ways:
(1) earned income; (2) income sharing with other family members;
and (3) social welfare.405 As we have seen, the first pathway to finan-
cial stability, earned income, presents challenges for women gen-
erally and women who are battered in particular.406 Not only do
women struggle due to a history of inequality, those that are bat-
tered may face serious risks associated with their labor force
entry.407 The second pathway, income sharing through batterer man-
dated support, presents potential safety risks and significant en-
forcement challenges.408 The third pathway, government support,
provides that greatest promise of financial stability while posing
modest risk of harm. Protective measures to reduce the occurrence
of physical violence and threats of harm, coupled with social welfare,
may be the key to allowing women to exit the abusive relationship,
focus on recovery, build their employment skills, and work toward
financial independence.
Race and gender matter when it comes to the likelihood that
U.S. government programs will provide resources, with African
American women fairing the worst. Research shows that while
white families have been “boosted out of poverty” at a rate of ap-
proximately fifty-one percent, the rate for black single mothers is
only about seven percent.409 The U.S., in fact, is the leader in
“single-parent poverty.”410 Whereas, income transfer programs in
countries such as Canada, France, the U.K., Sweden, and the
Netherlands are much more successful at helping lift single-parent
families out of poverty.411
Welfare reform in the U.S. has made it even more difficult for
women to obtain the support they need to free themselves from
poverty.412 In 1996, through the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA),
Congress replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), creating
new work requirements and placing time limitations on the lifetime
benefits needy individuals may obtain.413 These work requirements,
405. See ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 339, at 2 (“Aside from the few born to wealth,
people in this country get their income from three main sources: sharing the income of
other family members, earning income themselves in the labor market, and receiving
income from the government.”).
406. See supra Part I.
407. See supra Part IV.B.
408. See supra Part IV.A.
409. See ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 339, at 83.
410. Id. at 85.
411. Id. at 84–85.
412. Id. at 127–28.
413. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 35 (detailing the welfare reforms of 1996). For an in
depth consideration of welfare reform, see also ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 339, at 122–28.
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in particular, create a host of problems for women who need to seek
safety and stability first, with paid employment to follow once pro-
tections are afforded. In addition, paid labor alone is unlikely to
provide the level of income necessary to enable a woman who is
exiting an abusive relationship to support herself and her children
given her level of education or work history.414
The sixty-month cap on lifetime benefits also creates difficul-
ties. Experts suggest that it may take a woman in an abusive rela-
tionship five or more attempts to successfully extract herself from
a violent relationship.415 Because separation is one of the most dan-
gerous times for a survivor of domestic violence,416 a battered woman
may reconcile with her abuser to ward off a risk of physical injury
or in response to a threat of harm. As a result, a woman who is bat-
tered may need to seek government benefits more frequently and in
excess of the sixty month limit over her lifetime, given the multiple
challenges she faces exiting the abusive relationship.
The Family Violence Option (FVO) pursuant to the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), was created with an eye toward the
particular needs of women who are battered. The FVO allows for
waivers from TANF time limitations and work requirements for
survivors of intimate partner violence.417 The work requirement
waiver, in particular, provides woman exiting the abusive relation-
ship with the opportunity to focus on the needs of her children, put
in place safety measures, and start the healing process (both emo-
tionally and physically) before she enters the paid labor force.
A waiver pursuant to FVO, however, is not an automatic
guarantee for a battered woman. First, she must be aware of this
waiver option,418 and second, she must be willing to disclose the fact
that she has suffered abuse at the hands of her batterer to her
welfare workers.419
414. ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 339, at 129 (“[W]ithout substantial training or
education, some women will not be able to find jobs at all, let alone jobs that pay a liv-
ing wage.”).
415. People v. Basulto, No. B1599939, 2003 WL 22456800, at *4 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 30, 2003) (quoting the testimony of Jeri Darr, domestic violence expert witness).
416. See Sharon L. Gold, Why Are Victims of Domestic Violence Still Dying at the
Hands of Their Abusers? Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws, 91 KY.
L.J. 935, 940 (2002) (maintaining that batterers are more likely to increase their level
of dangerous behavior after the victim leaves in an effort to regain their power over her).
417. BRUSH, supra note 181, at 41.
418. Cole & Buel, supra note 245, at 316 (“[I]n many instances TANF applicants and
recipients are not told or do not understand that they may get special assistance if
domestic violence poses a safety risk and an employment barrier.”).
419. Id. at 309.
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CONCLUSION
It is men who stay . . . .420
Although there is no single reason why intimate partner violent
relationships endure, it is clear that batterers are able maintain
control over their victims due, in large part, to the economic inse-
curity of women who are abused. Economic dependence is the link
that binds a woman to her abuser, drawing her in over and over
again; it is, in effect, one of the best predictors of continuing violence
once the abuse begins. Financial insecurity increases the danger
levels, limits avenues of escape, and reduces the likelihood that a
survivor of intimate partner violence, once liberated, will remain
free from her abuser.
The present state of our economy suggests that the intersection
between financial inequality and intimate partner violence poses
significant risks to women who are abused. Studies suggest that the
economic crisis may be the cause of both increased conflict within
the intimate relationship, as well as a rise in the number of women
seeking services. Because this problem is complex and extensive, the
solution must be comprehensive.
Our response must take into consideration the economic impli-
cations of intimate partner violence and respond with economic
solutions. This approach must be comprehensive, including reform
within our legal system, governmental programs, and labor in-
dustry. Because paid labor alone will not solve the problem, our
legal system must improve batterer-mandated support obligations,
as well as court enforcement of those orders. At the same time, social
welfare programs must be strengthened to appropriately meet the
needs of battered women and their children and to end the cycle of
violence fueled by resource control, male-power, and abuse.
420. See STARK, supra note 1, at 130 (answering his own question posed at the outset
of this piece).
